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INTRODUCTION
This article is about how Montana has determined the
contours of the public’s right to use the waters of the state for
recreation. Pursuant to Montana’s Constitution, the Montana
Supreme court has repeatedly applied the Public Trust Doctrine to
waters that the state owns for the use of its people, holding that the
public has the right to the recreational use of waters that are
capable of recreational use, including the use of the beds and banks
of streams and rivers, even where the beds and banks are privately
owned.1 This article is primarily a chronological narrative of the
remarkable development, adoption, and testing of the unique story
surrounding stream access in Montana
This article will explore the early legal background, then the
1.
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont.
1984); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984);
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3).

72

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

seminal 1984 Montana cases, Curran2 and Hildreth,3 the subsequent
adoption by the Montana Legislature in 1985 of the Stream Access
Law4 (this common name will be used throughout the text), and the
following testing and probing of the perimeters of the Stream
Access Law’s principals and details in litigation and legislative
effort. In addition, a history and description of the executive
branch’s implementation of the Stream Access Law and
management of public recreational use of streams and rivers is
undertaken.
The journey is an absorbing legal and political drama with a
central thread of the broad and encompassing public right to use for
recreation the water that Montana owns for the “use of its people.”5
This long, fascinating, and successful history is chronicled from a
legal perspective, although the story could also be told from a
purely political and public participation perspective that was
equally eventful and important. In light of the scope of this article,
that perspective is left for other storytellers.
The legal history of stream access in Montana is not by any
means the whole story. This author plans to submit a second,
follow-up article that will examine Montana’s Stream Access Law
through a comparison of how neighboring states have determined
and limited public recreational rights, comparisons that highlight
the unique approach, in significant respects, that Montana has
taken. The main thrust of this saga, thirty plus years in the making
now, will provide the backdrop for comments on the law’s successes
or short-comings, issues addressed, issues that will eventually need
to be addressed, the recognition of potential future pitfalls and how
to avoid them, and an assessment of the merits of Montana’s
approach. This is illustrated by the intense interest of the public and
riparian landowners, and is underscored in comparisons with
neighboring states.
As a preliminary matter, the Stream Access Law and
2.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163.
3.
Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088.
4.
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1127 (codified as Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 23-2-301 to 322 (1985)).
5.
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3).
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recreational use of streams, rivers, and lakes is administered
primarily by the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks6
(“DFWP”) and the Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks Commission7
(“Commission”). The roles of DFWP and the Commission will be
detailed throughout this article.

A. Navigable for Title and Navigable for Recreation
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the legal
concepts of navigability for title and navigability for recreation.
Navigability for title describes those rivers that are “navigable in
fact” under federal law for state ownership of the underlying bed of
the river.8 Navigable for recreation describes streams and rivers
that the public has the right to use for recreation under state law
and includes navigable for title rivers plus all other streams and
rivers that Montana law has determined are available for public
recreational use.9
The idea that states, as sovereigns, own the beds of
navigable waters has its origins in English common law.10 Initially,
the thirteen colonies were held to own the bed of navigable waters
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.11 The United States
Supreme Court subsequently extended the concept of sovereign
ownership by each of the thirteen original states to “all their
navigable waters and the soils under them.”12 In addition, the title
6.
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-3401 (2013) (establishing the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks).
7.
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-3402 (2013) The name of the
Commission was the Fish and Game Commission until the name was changed
to the Fish, Wildlife and Parks Commission in 1991. See 1991 Mont. Laws ch.
28 103 §1. Then it changed to Fish and Wildlife Commission in 2013. See 2013
Mont. Laws ch. 235 816 §6. However, the authority for the Commission
relative to Stream Access Law did not change with the name changes.
8.
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012).
9.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d. 1088.
10.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894); PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct.
at 1226-27.
11.
PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1226-27.
12.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
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to territorial lands under navigable water was declared to be held in
trust for future states under the Equal Footing Doctrine.13 Through
this doctrine, a state’s title to these lands is conferred by the United
States Constitution.
Thus, “questions of navigability for
determining state riverbed title are governed by federal law.”14
The United States Supreme Court opinion in The Daniel
Ball15 case set the formula for determining navigability of water,
stating:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water.16

The Daniel Ball test is also used for the purposes of
assessing federal regulatory authority and the applicability of
specific federal statutes. When used to determine state title under
the Equal Footing Doctrine, the test is based on the “natural and
ordinary” condition of the water at the time of statehood;17 depends
only on navigation and does not require interstate commerce;18 is
applied on a segment-by-segment basis with each segment judged
as to whether the river is or is not navigable;19 and river segments
are navigable for title only if they were used or were susceptible of
use “as highways of commerce at the time of statehood.”20
In contrast, the concept of navigable for recreation is based
on the Public Trust Doctrine, which has been held to be a matter of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228-29 (1845).
PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1871).
Id. at 563.
PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id. at 1233.
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state law.21 In summary:
Under accepted principles of federalism, the states
retain residual power to determine the scope of the
public trust over water within their borders, while
federal law determines riverbed title under the
equal-footing doctrine.22
I. STREAM ACCESS CASES AND STATUTES

A. Pre-Curran and Hildreth
In 1895, the Montana Supreme Court in Gibson v. Kelly
decided whether a riparian landowner to a navigable river owned to
the ordinary low-water, or to the ordinary high-water mark.23 The
property at issue in the case was along the Missouri River in
Choteau County. The defendant was occupying the low-water to
high-water strip in front of the plaintiff’s land and was excluding the
plaintiff from the property. Ultimately, the plaintiff was seeking
the court’s aid in ejecting this intruder.24
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged that the question of
ownership varied among the states deciding the issue.25 The Court
held that the riparian landowner owned to the low-water mark in
view of the circumstances of the state. Absent any other specific
support, the Court reinforced its decision by explaining, “also for
the reason that the rule just announced by decision will become, in
a few months, the rule by statute.”26 The Court did not fully
explain its conclusion; however, the holding made it easier to find
that the intruder was trespassing and avoided a conflict with the
new civil code.
21.
Id. at 1235.
22.
Id.
23.
Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517 (Mont. 1895).
24.
Id. at 517.
25.
Id. at 518.
26.
Id. at 519. The new civil code the court was referring to had
been approved by the Governor and would become the law on July 1, 1895.
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The Court acknowledged that “the public [has] certain
rights of navigation and fishery upon the river and upon the strip in
question,” although the “rights of navigation or of fishing are not at
all involved in these pleadings.” Nevertheless, the court concluded
the plaintiff owned the strip, “subject only to the public use of
navigation and fishing.”27 Whether or not the court’s comments on
the public’s right to use the strip for navigation and fishing are
interpreted as dicta, the real defect of the Gibson decision lies in
the lack of reasoning. More specifically, it was left unclear how the
Court and the legislature could concede to riparian landowners
what otherwise would be public property.
The Civil Code of 1895 in section 1291, codified the rule
that “the owner of the land, when it borders upon a navigable lake
or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water
mark.”28 The 1895 legislature, in the new civil code, claimed the
state as owner of “all land below the water of a navigable lake or
stream.”29 The 1895 Legislature, in adopting the Political Code of
Montana, defined public ways as: “[n]avigable waters and all
streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the
country are public ways for the purposes of navigation and
transportation.”30
In Herrin v. Sutherland, decided in 1925, the defendant was
sued for trespass on the land of the plaintiff in eight separate causes
of action.31 In six of the causes of action, the defendant clearly
trespassed on the plaintiff’s land. The charges included: tramping
on hay and grain crops; breaking through a fence to hunt birds;
crossing the plaintiff’s private land to access public land and to get
to a pond fully enclosed within plaintiff’s land; and shooting a

27.
28.

Id. at 519-20.

29.

Civ. Code § 1091 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 70-1-

30.
85-1-111).
31.

Political Code § 2570 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. §

Civ. Code § 1291 (1895) (codified as Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-

201).
202).

Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925).
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shotgun while on the plaintiff’s land.32
Two of the causes of action merit closer scrutiny, one may
have addressed walking on the strip of land between the low-water
and high-water marks of a navigable river and the other may have
been a trespass for wading up a non-navigable stream. Of note,
defendant was also found to be trespassing because, after rowing
his boat up the channel of the Missouri River in Lewis and Clark
County and fishing, the plaintiff walked above the ordinary lowwater mark and above the high-water mark and “tramped upon and
destroyed native and planted grasses.” The Court concluded the
defendant was a trespasser in going upon plaintiff’s land “in the
fashion described.”33 It would be a stretch to consider Herrin as
holding that it was a trespass for a person rowing a boat on a
navigable for title river to walk along the strip between the lowwater and high-water marks, especially considering that the ruling
in Kelly v. Gibson was not even addressed. It seems safe to assume
then that the Court must have meant that the trespass occurred
when the defendant went above the high-water mark.
The problematic cause of action surrounded the acts of the
defendant wading up and down Fall Creek, a non-navigable stream,
while fishing. The court said: “It would seem clear that a man has
no right to fish where he has no right to be.”34 However, the
Court’s holding in this regard is confusing because the defendant
again went upon the land of the plaintiff when he “tramped upon
and destroyed the hay.”35 In this light, the Court’s opinion remains
unclear. Did the Court hold the defendant was simply a trespasser,
or did the Court hold that a person trespasses by wading and fishing
in a non-navigable stream?
Importantly, the interpretation of this language is relevant
to understanding the Court’s more modern jurisprudence on the
issue. If the latter was the actual intended holding, Curran in 1984
overruled the holding.36 Justice Holloway, in a concurring opinion,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id.
Curran, 682 P.2d at 171 (“[T]he holding [in Herrin] is purely
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would have disposed of the case summarily because in each cause
of action there was a technical trespass.37
Since 1933, a Montana statute has recognized a public right
to use the water and banks up to the “high water flow line” of
“navigable” rivers, streams, and sloughs for fishing.38 If the term
“navigable” means navigable for title rivers, sloughs and streams,
then the statute makes it clear that the angling public has an
easement to use the strip between the ordinary low-water and highwater marks, a strip of land that by statute is owned by the riparian
landowner.39 Alternatively, if the statute was intended to apply to
more than just navigable for title rivers and streams, the language
could arguably encompass more than just the strip of land on
navigable for title rivers because the language addresses “any rights
of title” between the high-water lines which could then include nonnavigable for title streams.40
Such an interpretation is less far-fetched when the statutory
definition of public ways is considered. The statutory language
added to navigable waters, “all streams of sufficient capacity,” not
just for the purpose of navigation, but also for the transportation of
“the products of the country.”41 Potentially, this language could
dicta, has no precedential value[,] . . . and . . . is contrary to the public trust
doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution.” Id.) (emphasis added).
37.
Herrin, 241 P. 333.
38.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305 (1933) provides: “Navigable
rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water . . . shall
hereafter be public waters for the purpose of angling, and any rights of title to
such streams or the land between the high water flow lines or within the
meander lines of navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person .
. . who desires to angle therein or along their banks to go upon the same for
such purpose.” Additionally, rivers and streams are navigable if they have
“been meandered and returned as navigable” by United States surveyors, or if
they are navigable in fact. 1933 Mont. Laws ch. 95, §§ 1, 2 (codified as Mont.
Code Ann. § 85-1-112).
39.
Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-201 (1895).
40.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305; see Herrin, 241 P. 333.
41.
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-1-111 (1901) This statute provides in
pertinent part that “[n]avigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to
transport the products of the country are public ways for the purposes of
navigation and such transportation.” Id. (emphasis added).
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support more than just the use of navigable for title rivers for
transportation, but all waters that meet the test of sufficient
capacity. While this may be regarded as a stretch, the district court
in Curran employed a similar parsing of the language to define a
recreational floating or pleasure boat test for navigable for
recreation streams that included using the bed and banks.42
The discussion of stream access in Montana prior to the
Curran and Hildreth litigation and the 1985 Legislature’s adoption
of the Stream Access Law would not be complete without
considering how the 1972 Constitutional Convention addressed
stream access and the Public Trust Doctrine.
The delegates of the Constitutional Convention discussed
the Public Trust Doctrine with the resulting adoption of two
proposed constitutional provisions addressing a clean and healthful
environment. Both are now part of the 1972 Constitution ratified
by the people of Montana, one as an enumerated inalienable
right,43 and the other establishing a duty of the state and each
person to maintain and improve.44 Most significant for stream
access was language added in the revised section on water rights.
There, the relevant language states that waters in the state “are the
property of the state for the use of its people.”45
In a discussion of the above phrase, Delegate Aronow
expressed his opinion on the state of stream access at the time:
you can go up and down that stream all you want to.
But the only thing is, you can’t drive across the
rancher’s lands willy-nilly in order to get to it. You
42.
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, No. 45148, (1st
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 7, 1982) (mem. re mots. for sum. j.); See infra at
11-14, discussion of the Dearborn River case in Curran, No. 45148.
43.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 3 (inalienable rights); Constitutional
Convention Tr. 2933, 2934 (adoption).
44.
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1(1). “The state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful in Montana for present and future
generations.” Constitutional Convention Tr. 2938, 2939 (adoption).
45.
Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3) (emphasis added); Constitutional
Convention Vol. II, 552-553 (Nat’l Res. & Agric. Majority Proposal), Trans.
2938, 2939 (adoption).
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can go along the county roads or wherever there’s
access. And you certainly may boat. You may hike
up and down that stream.46
There was a delegate proposal that foreshadowed stream
access to a remarkable degree, but was not further discussed.47
While the Constitutional Convention did not adopt any more
specific provision,48 one way or the other, on stream access, there
was the above prescient acknowledgement of stream access.

B. The Dearborn River Case (Curran) in District Court
The Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc.
(“Coalition”), filed a lawsuit in the First Judicial District of the
State of Montana on April 14, 1980, asserting that the public had
the right to float, fish, and recreate between the high-water marks
of the Dearborn River, as it flows through the property of
landowner Dennis Michael Curran.49 As the litigation proceeded,
the Montana Department of State Lands (now reorganized within
the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation)
46.
Constitutional Convention Tr. 1305.
47.
Constitutional Convention Vol. I, 76. Delegate Proposal No. 2
proposed a new constitutional section that would provide: “Section ---. Water.
All of the water in this state, whether occurring on the surface or
underground, and whether occurring naturally or artificially, belongs to the
people of Montana; and those waters which are capable of substantial or
significant public use may be used by the people with or without diversion or
development works, regardless of whether the waters occur on public or
private lands. The public has the right to the recreational use of such waters
and their beds and banks to the high water mark regardless of whether the
waters are navigable and regardless of whether the beds and banks are
privately owned. Beneficial use of waters includes recreation and aesthetics,
such as habitat for fish and wildlife and scenic waterways.” Id. The remainder
of the proposal was language on water use similar to other proposals including
language that passed.
48.
A new proposed Constitution of Montana was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention March 22, 1972 and was ratified by the people June
6, 1972 (Referendum No. 68).
49.
Curran, No. 45148 (mem. re mots. for summ. j.).
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intervened as a plaintiff, claiming the state had title to the bed of
the Dearborn River. Subsequently, DFWP and the State of
Montana were joined as involuntary plaintiffs.
DFWP described the Dearborn River as follows:
The Dearborn River originates along the east slope
of the Continental Divide in west-central Montana.
The river flows generally in a southeasterly direction
from its source near Scapegoat Mountain,
approximately 30 miles southwest of Augusta,
Montana, to the Missouri River, a distance of
approximately 66 miles. The first 20 miles of the
Dearborn’s course is through mountainous and
canyon terrain, roughly 12 miles of which lie in the
Scapegoat Wilderness. After this traverse, the river
merges onto rolling plain and continues its flow for
about 29 miles where it again enters a moderately
timbered area. The Dearborn flows for another 17
miles and enters the Missouri River near Craig,
Montana.50
Landowner Curran owned or controlled land through which
approximately seven miles of the Dearborn flows, both upstream
and downstream from where U.S. Highway 287 crosses the
Dearborn.51 Historically, Curran had denied members of the public
from floating, fishing, and recreating on the Dearborn River where
it crossed his land, claiming ownership of the streambed.52
Members of the public had for some time been floating, fishing, and
observing the scenic beauty of the Dearborn River, with
recreational floating available at least four months of the year.53
Based on “statute of necessity,” the district court developed
a “practical rule” that a “Montana stream is navigable and
50.
Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. for Dept. of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks (DFWP) at 1-2, Curran, No. 45148 (Apr. 23, 1982).
51.
Curran, 682 P.2d at 165.
52.
Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 50, at 2.
53.
Id. at 12-13.
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accessible over so much of its entire course as is navigable by
recreational craft at any given time.”54 Under this rule of
recreational navigation, aquatic recreationists could utilize a
qualifying stream “between ordinary high water levels,” including
wading in the stream and walking on dry land below the ordinary
high-water line.55 This rule was based on state law, as contrasted
with the federal rule determining navigable rivers for state title, i.e.
ownership of the underlying bed.
The district court based its holding on an interpretation of
three state statutes. Because Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305
allows anglers to go along the banks of any “[n]avigable rivers,
sloughs, or streams between the ordinary high water” to fish, and
because Montana Code Annotated § 85-1-112 defines as navigable
as “all rivers and streams which are navigable in fact,” the district
court concluded that the legislature intended that streams capable
of transporting anglers in some type of watercraft are “navigable”
under Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305, and therefore should
be accessible to licensed anglers.56
Furthermore, the district court found that the legislature
had broadened recreational navigability to all recreationists with
the codified definition of public waterways in Montana Code
Annotated § 85-1-111.57 The district court found by using these two
separate terms “navigation” and “transportation” the legislature
intended to include “ordinary, non-commercial travel” in the
concept of navigation. Navigation then, by state statute, includes
travel for fishing, hunting, and recreation.58 The district court also
found that the Dearborn River is navigable for title purposes with
the bed of the river between the low-water marks owned by the
state. This was based on evidence of log floating at the time

54.
Curran, No. 45148 at 4 (mem. re mots. for summ. j.).
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 2-3.
57.
“Navigable water and all streams of sufficient capacity to carry
the products of the country are public ways for the purpose of navigation and
such transportation.” Id. at 3 (quoting Mont. Code. Ann. § 85-1-111).
58.
Id. at 3-4.
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statehood was granted.59
The district court then dismissed the motion of DFWP that
Article IX, § 3(3) of the 1972 Montana Constitution means the
waters of the Dearborn are “public waters” held in trust for public
uses.60 DFWP’s argument was based on the language of subsection
(3), which provides that “[a]ll surface . . . waters . . . are the
property of the state for the use of its people.” The district court
reasoned that: Article IX was not self-executing; the legislature had
not implemented any right of the public for recreational access to
state waters; and the probable purpose of Article IX, as a whole,
“was to preserve the historical appropriation system of water rights
. . . rather than to assume public access to water for purposes other
than appropriation.”61 The district court cited the Colorado
Supreme Court’s opinion in Emmert62 for this principle, but also
decided that the common law rule “he who owns the land controls
that above it” had been set aside by the legislature though its
statutes on navigable streams.63
The district court granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
defendant’s counterclaim for inverse condemnation.64 The key
points of the district court’s decision in Curran are that members of
the public have the right to float and recreate in non-navigable
streams, that they may wade and use the banks up to the ordinary
high-water, and that these rights are founded in statutory language.
Later, on appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held the public has
broader rights that are permanently established by the Public Trust
Doctrine embedded in the Montana Constitution.

59.
60.
50, at 13-15.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 7-16.
Id. at 16-18; Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., supra note
Curran, No. 45148 at 17 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.).
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
Curran, No. 45148 at 17 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.).
Id. at 18.
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C. The Beaverhead River Case (Hildreth) in District Court
The Coalition, on April 8, 1981, filed a complaint in the
state district court for Beaverhead County asserting that members
of the public had the right to float and recreate on the Beaverhead
River.65 The suit was against landowner Lowell S. Hildreth for a
variety of actions. Most notably, Hildreth had installed a fence
across the downstream side of a bridge on his property, was
preparing to install a cable across the river further upstream, and
was harassing and interfering with floaters.66
The Beaverhead River is formed by the confluence of
Horse Prairie Creek and the Red Rock River, now inundated by
the Clark Canyon Dam. The Beaverhead River flows in a
northeastern direction for fifty miles from the dam to join the Big
Hole River where they form the Jefferson River near Twin
Bridges.67 The river flows through Hildreth’s land for 1.5 miles,
starting approximately two miles below the dam.68 The Beaverhead
River was, and had been for decades, floated by persons fishing and
recreating without permission.69 Initially, the landowner was
enjoined from interfering with floaters and required to remove the
fence on the downside of Hildreth bridge across the river.70
Hildreth’s counterclaim for a taking by inverse condemnation was
dismissed in part, because the court found no viable takings claim
under either of the potential outcomes, i.e., if the members of the
public had a right to float or did not have a right to float, the issue
of a takings was resolved either way.71
The district court held:

65.
Judicial Dist.
law).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, No. 9604 (5th
Ct. Mont. Dec. 7, 1982) (findings of facts and conclusions of

Id. at 10.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 12.
Id. (May 15, 1981) (prelim. inj.).
Id. (June 23, 1982) (order).
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The Beaverhead River, where it runs through the
property of Defendant, is navigable under the
pleasure-boat test of navigability, and, as such,
members of the public have the right to float the
river and use its banks up to the ordinary high water
mark free from interference from Defendant.72
The court also held that the public could portage around the bridge
during times of high-water “when necessary, in a manner which is
least intrusive to the interference with Defendant’s property.”73 The
court had initially severed and reserved the issue of Hildreth’s
counterclaim for an inverse condemnation. Then, the court, in
certifying its final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure, rejected the counterclaim with the
following language: “[t]his court views the issues decided in favor of
plaintiff to be dispositive of the remaining issues, and if affirmed on
appeal, the remaining issues would probably be thereby resolved.”74
In review, both district courts adopted a pleasure boat test
of navigability for recreational use, not just to float a river, but to
also use the bed and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark.
Interestingly, one court based its holding on an interpretation of
state statutes on navigability, but rejected the Public Trust Doctrine
in its decision. The other based its decision on the persuasive force
of holdings in other jurisdictions, without mentioning the public
trust at all. As it turns out, the Montana Supreme Court would see
things differently.

D. The Montana Supreme Court Decisions in Curran and Hildreth
Twice in the summer of 1984, the Montana Supreme Court
was faced with deciding what rights the public had to utilize streams
and rivers in Montana for recreation: first, in Curran and one
month later in Hildreth.

72.
73.
74.

Id. at 14 (findings of fact and conclusions of law).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 2 (Dec. 22, 1982) (j.).
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In Montana Coalition for Steam Access v. Curran,75 decided
May 15, 1984 and written by Chief Justice Haswell, the Court issued
a uniquely broad and encompassing determination of the public
right to stream access. Initially, the Court affirmed the district
court’s decision that the Dearborn River was navigable under the
federal law of navigability for title by application of a log-floating
test and, therefore, title to the riverbed was held by the state in
accordance with the Equal Footing Doctrine.76 The Court then
addressed whether, under state law, recreational use and fishing
make a stream navigable. The Court, in clear and exceptionally
broad language held:
In sum, we hold that, under the public trust doctrine
and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface
waters that are capable of recreational use may be
so used by the public without regard to streambed
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational
purposes.77
The Court cited to specific language in Article IX, § 3(3) of the
1972 Montana Constitution:
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric
waters within the boundaries of the state are
property of the state for the use of its people and are
subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided in law.78
It seems ironic that the Court cited the Wyoming Supreme Court in
support for the proposition that the public can use water suitable
for recreation “without regard to title or navigability,”79 as
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
1961)).

Curran, 682 P.2d 163.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170 (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d. 137, 147 (Wyo.
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Wyoming’s prohibition on touching the bed and banks of nonnavigable for title streams, stands almost in polar opposition to
Montana’s law on stream access.80 In fact, the Court erroneously
summarized Wyoming law as holding “that public recreational use
of the waters was limited only by the susceptibility of the water for
that purpose.”81
Of great importance, the Montana Court cited to and
quoted from the seminal 1892 United States Supreme Court
decision as clearly defining the Public Trust Doctrine.82 The Court
first found that under the Public Trust Doctrine “states hold title to
navigable waterways in trust for public benefit”83 and then declared
that under the Constitution of Montana, all waters of the state “are
owned by the state and are held in trust for the people.”84
However, the Court cautioned the opinion did not grant
the public any right to “enter upon or cross over private property to
reach state owned waters hereby held available for recreational
purposes.”85 Rather, the Court held, “that the public has the right
to use the state-owned water to the point of the high water mark”
except for barriers which the public could portage around “in the
least intrusive way” while “avoiding damage to private property.”86
In support of its finding that the public right to use streams extends
to the high-water mark, the Court relied on the “angling statute,”87
and Gibson v. Kelly, an 1895 decision that “recognized a public
right to access for fishing and navigational purposes.”88
Just over a month later, the Court issued its opinion in
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth. Again authored
80.
Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46 (limiting stream access in Wyoming to
floating only, with no wading or walking on the bed and banks).
81.
Curran, at 170.
82.
Id. at 167-68 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892)).
83.
Id. at 168.
84.
Id. at 170.
85.
Id. at 172.
86.
Id. at 172.
87.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-305.
88.
Curran, at 172; for the angling statute, see supra note 38; for a
discussion of Gibson v. Kelly, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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by Chief Justice Haswell, the Court’s opinion reinforced the
public’s right to recreate in Montana streams by deciding public
recreational use rights on a stream that was not navigable for title.89
The district court had “found the Beaverhead River navigable for
recreation under the pleasure-boat test.” The Court affirmed the
result but said it was “unnecessary and improper to determine a
specific test under which to find navigability for recreational use.”90
The Court reinforced Curran, saying:
the capability of the use of the waters for
recreational purposes determines whether the
waters can be so used. The Montana Constitution
clearly provides that the state owns the waters for
the benefit of its people. The Constitution does not
limit the waters’ use. Consequently, this Court
cannot limit their use by inventing some restrictive
test.91
The Court addressed specifically the corresponding public right to
use the bed and banks:
Under the 1972 Constitution, the only possible
limitation of use can be the characteristics of the
waters themselves. Therefore no owner of property
adjacent to state-owned waters has the right to
control the use of those waters as they flow through
his property. The public has the right to use the
waters and the bed and banks up to the ordinary
high water mark.92
In summary, the Court held, and confirmed in agreement
with Curran, that for rivers that are navigable for recreational
purposes public use is limited “only by the capabilities of the water
89.
90.
91.
92.

Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
Id.
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for such use”93 and “the public has the right to use the bed and
banks up to the ordinary high water mark.”94 Therefore, Curran
and Hildreth recognize a public right to recreate in waters by
floating, wading, and walking along the bank up to the high-water
mark.
In dismissing Hildreth’s claim for inverse condemnation, the
Court explained that “[p]ublic use of the waters and bed and banks
of the Beaverhead up to the ordinary high water mark was
determined, not title.”95 Further, because “Hildreth has never
owned and does not now own the waters of the Beaverhead
River”96 he was not “deprived of a property right by the district
court.”97
Justice Gulbrandson dissented and would have left the
conflicts between landowners and recreational users up to the
Montana legislature. He claimed, based on recent sessions, “there
has been public evidence that a reasonable and legal solution could
have been achieved within the legislative forum.”98 As we shall see,
infra, the legislature was contemplating stream access significantly
more restrictive than stream access required by the Curran and
Hildreth decisions.
II. THE STREAM ACCESS DEBATE IN THE MONTANA
LEGISLATURE PRIOR TO AND FOLLOWING CURRAN
AND HILDRETH
As the story now transitions to the public policy arena, it is
important to appreciate the position in which the Montana
Legislature found itself following the landmark decisions just
announced. To be sure, the Montana Supreme Court had left no
doubt as to the perimeter of a very broad and encompassing public
recreation right anchored in the Montana Constitution and the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
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Public Trust Doctrine. Yet, the suspense of the time surrounded
the looming question of whether the legislature would honor the
constitutional and public trust mandates of the Montana Supreme
Court.
Across the state, the politics and social ideals of public
access were dividing Montanans. The legislature, in the 1983
Session and for most of the interim before the 1985 Session, was
setting a course towards a comparatively quite restrictive version of
public access. Even after the May and June 1984 Supreme Court
decisions, a dramatic struggle ensued between very restrictive
stream access proposals and the very broad framework established
by the Supreme Court.

A. The 1983 Legislature Failed to Adopt Any Stream Access
Statutes
The Montana Legislature was indeed addressing stream
access concurrent with the process of the litigation in the district
courts and the Supreme Court. In the 1983 legislative session, there
were four significant bills introduced dealing with the subject of
stream access. The one that passed was House Joint Resolution
36.99 HJR 36 requested that an interim committee be assigned to
study the rights of the public to access and use public lands and
waterways and to identify and preserve the rights of landowners
adjacent to public land and waterways. The resolution identified a
list of study topics: methods of acquiring access across private land;
right of the public to use waterways, including a legislative
definition of navigability, if necessary, and use of adjacent uplands;
rights and title interests of adjacent landowners; landowner’s right
to place fences, bridges, flumes, etc. in the waterway; and liabilities
of landowners and public users.
Perhaps the strangest proposed bill of the 1983 Legislative
session was SB 348.100 The bill was a reaction to the district court
decision in the Curran litigation. The district court had read the
99.
H.R.J. Res. 36, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Mar. 19, 1983).
100.
S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 3, 1983)
(Introduced Bill).
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statutory definition of navigable in Montana Code Annotated § 851-112 as broader than the requirements set out by the U.S. Supreme
Court for determination of rivers navigable for title. This
determination, coupled with Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-305
that allows anglers to wade on the bed and banks of state defined
“navigable streams,” was the grounding of the district court’s
conclusion that Montana had a pleasure boat test for public access
of streams along with the use of the bed and banks.101
SB 348 narrowed the state statutory definition of “navigable
for recreation” to one more restrictive than the federal test of
“navigable for title.”102 In order to qualify, a stream must have
been “actually used in its ordinary condition as a highway for
commerce, travel and trade . . . and if the commerce, trade, and
travel were successful activities.” The federal Daniel Ball test
includes rivers that are susceptible of being used as highways of
commerce and do not necessarily require that the commerce be
successful. Furthermore, under the requirements of SB 348 for
recreational use, the stream must have been used in this manner on
the date of statehood, November 8, 1889.
The effect of SB 348 would have been dramatic. Under the
proposed law, the floating of logs and recreational use would not
qualify any stream for the status of navigable for recreation under
the new state law.103 For example, the Dearborn River would still
be a navigable river for title with the state owning the bed of the
river; however, under the new statutory definition the public would
have no right to float or fish the Dearborn River where it flowed
through private land. The DFWP testified that the bill “would
effectively ‘lock out’ historic uses of most of Montana’s rivers . . . In
fact, all portions of the original Blue Ribbon streams104 would be
101.
Curran, No. 45148, at 2-4 (mem. re mots. for sum. j.).
102.
See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; see also supra note 15
and accompanying text.
103.
S. 348, supra note 100, at 1-2.
104.
1969 Mont. Laws ch. 345, 875 (H.R. 450) amended Rev.
Code Mont. 1947 § 89-801 by adding § 2, which authorized the Commission to
appropriate instream flows in 12 “blue ribbon” streams and rivers “to
maintain stream flows necessary for the preservation of fish and wildlife
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excluded from the list of navigable streams.”105
Although SB 348 died in the Senate Judiciary Committee,106
several other bills were proposed with similarly egregious
ambitions. HB 799 would have transferred the title of the bed of
navigable for title rivers to any private riparian landowners107 in
clear violation of the Enabling Act, the Montana Constitution, and
the Public Trust Doctrine.108 HB 888, as introduced, would have
transferred title to the bed of navigable for title rivers to the
riparian landowners.109 This part of the bill was amended on the
House Floor to exclude rivers “determined at anytime to be
navigable under the federal navigability definition.”110 The effect
of the amendment was to return the ownership of the beds of
navigable rivers to the state, albeit in an awkwardly worded
amendment to Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201.111 The other
major amendment in the bill was to create a Wyoming type stream
access112 limited to floating rivers only with “a canoe, kayak,
habitat.” Id. The 1973 Montana Water Use Act repealed § 89-801 of 1973
Mont Laws ch. 452, § 46, 1121. However, the repeal did not affect the
completed instream flow appropriations.
105.
S. JUDICIARY COMM., DEBATE ON S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. Feb. 16, 1983) (written testimony of Jim Flynn, Director, DFWP).
106.
History and Final Status, S. 348, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res., 118 (Mont. 1983).
107.
H.R. 799, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 15, 1983)
(Introduced Bill).
108.
The Enabling Act of 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (Feb. 22, 1889); Mont.
Const. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1. Both require full market value for the disposal
of state land. The Public Trust Doctrine as adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court in Curran, 682 P.2d at 167-8 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387). The
Doctrine prohibits, except in limited circumstances, Montana from conveying
navigable river beds into private ownership.
109.
H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 17, 1983)
(Introduced Bill).
110.
H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Mont. Feb. 22, 1983)
(3d Reading). The amendment was confusing because the language as
amended no longer said whether the riparian landowner takes to the low or
high-water mark.
111.
Id.
112.
Day, 362 P.2d at 145-46 (limits stream access in Wyoming to
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inflatable boat, skiff, or any other boat designed to be propelled by
oar, paddle, or motor.”113
Both HB 888 as introduced and as amended, would allow
members of the public “to navigate and exercise the instance of
navigation” in rivers using the defined watercraft.114 This in itself
presumably would not allow floaters to wade or touch the bed and
banks, except to portage around obstructions. Since Montana Code
Annotated § 87-2-305 was not amended, which allows anglers to use
the bed and banks of navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams, the issue
of the use of the beds and banks would be somewhat uncertain if
HB 888 had passed. 115
All of these three major bills (SB 348, HB 799, and HB 888)
proposed to adopt stream access provisions that would be radically
more restrictive than the preceding district court decisions in the
Curran and Hildreth litigation. The study resolution, HJR 36,
however would provide an informative window on the political
debate, both before and after the Supreme Court decisions in
Curran and Hildreth, in the summer of 1985.116

B. The 1985 Legislature Enacts the Stream Access Law
After the 1983 session, the odyssey of the adoption of the
present stream access statutes began. To follow in a meaningful
way the course of the legislative struggle and eventual success, it is
critical to keep in mind the two main threads of stream access in
floating only with no wading or walking on the bed and banks).
113.
H.R. 888, supra note 109, at 2-3.
114.
Id. at § 3 (Mont. Feb. 17, 1983) (Introduced Copy) (adding §
(3)(a) to Mont. Code Ann. § 85-1-112); H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
Section 3 (Mont. Feb. 22, 1983) (3d Reading) (amending new § (3)(a) of Mont.
Code Ann. § 85-1-112) (this amendment would have limited stream access to
navigable for title rivers).
115.
History and Final Status, H.R. 888, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 316 (Mont. 1983). House Bill 888 passed in the House, but
died in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation;
History and Final Status, H.R. 799, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res.
287 (Mont. 1983). H.R. 799 in the House Committee on Fish and Game.
116.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088.
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Montana. The primary stream access guarantees of the Supreme
Court’s Curran and Hildreth decisions are that the capability of a
stream for recreation defines the extent of the public right, and that
the public has the right to use the bed and banks of a stream up to
the ordinary high-water mark while recreating in a stream.
Translated to its practical application, several principles followed:
all streams are open to stream access; there can be no floating or
pleasure boat test; and recreationists may wade in the stream and
walk on the bank up to the ordinary high-water line.
Nevertheless, one significant question remained unresolved
by the Court: how to define the details of the extent and limits of
stream access? Addressing these details in statute would provide
specific guidance for recreationists and protect the private property
rights of riparian landowners. This category of definitions includes:
defining the ordinary high-water mark, recreational use, and
barriers; determining what activities do not qualify and are not
allowed as water-related pleasure activities; how to regulate
portage activities; how to treat water diverted into irrigation and
drainage ditches and water conveyed as part of a municipal water
supply system; what activities are not appropriate in the smaller
streams; limits on landowners liability; assuring that the recreating
public has no right to cross private property to get to a stream or
river; and that access across private property by the public cannot
be the basis of a prescriptive easement.
While the above principles will determine the merits of
proposed legislation and help grade the debate and final legislative
product, initially the legislature did not have the absolute resolve of
the Supreme Court’s decisions. Instead, the two district court
decisions, based on statutory interpretations or the application of
common law principles, allowed the legislature almost unlimited
latitude prior to the Curran and Hildreth decisions.
In June 1983, the Legislative Council (a committee
composed of legislators with the duty of overseeing and directing
legislative staff and interim activities)117 assigned the study of water
117.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-101 to 120 (1985) (established the
Legislative Council and authorized its powers and duties).
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recreation under HJR 36 to joint Interim Subcommittee No. 2.118
The committee met in August 1983, January 1984, and March 1984
to study the legal issues, develop a work plan, and hold a public
hearing.119 The tangible result was a request by the committee for
local groups and individuals, aided by conservation districts, to
identify floatable and non-floatable streams in their areas.120
Then, the legal and policy landscape changed dramatically
when the Curran decision was announced on May 15 and the
Hildreth decision on June 21.121 At the next meeting on July 30, the
committee was advised on the limits that the Supreme Court’s
decisions placed on legislative response. The committee was
advised that because of the Court’s ruling based on the Public Trust
Doctrine embedded in the language of Montana’s 1972
Constitution and applied to all surface waters “the only possible
limitation of the use arises from the characteristics of the water.”122
Professor Margery Brown advised on the decision space of the
Legislature in that it “may alter existing statutes not only to protect
this newly enunciated public right but also to underscore the public
responsibilities that go with these rights, insofar as protection of
adjacent landowner property rights is concerned.”123 Similarly,
another consultant advised that because the court based its decision
on the Public Trust Doctrine “the Legislature cannot substantially
modify the result of those decisions.
Had the court based its
decision on narrower grounds (e.g., statutory grounds), the
Legislature would have been able to modify the results of the
decisions by changing statutes.”124
Along the same line, Senator Jack Galt asked if a

118.
J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2, 49TH LEGIS., REPORT ON
RECREATIONAL USE OF MONTANA’S WATERWAYS 2 (1985).
119.
Id. at 5-6.
120.
Id. at 6-7.
121.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088.
122.
J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2, 49TH LEGIS., HJR 36 WATER
RECREATION STUDY, MINUTES, at 10 (July 30, 1984) (testimony of Margery
Brown, Assoc. Dean, Univ. of Mont. Sch. of Law).
123.
Id. at 11 (testimony of Dean Brown).
124.
Id. at 9 (testimony of consultant John Thorson).
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prohibition on the use of river beds would be legal and was advised,
“[t]he right to use the bed is so fundamentally related to the
public’s interest in the water that even the legislature cannot take it
away.”125 In spite of clear, contrary advice, the subcommittee voted
4-3 (Representative James D. Jenson absent) to draft a Wyomingtype bill that would restrict stream access to floating and prohibit
“the angler from walking up the stream.”126 At the following and
last meeting of the subcommittee on September 28, a motion to
strike this section of the subcommittee bill died on a tie vote.127
The result was a draft designated Legislative Council
(“LC”) 69128 that carried out the subcommittee’s recommendation
to the 1985 Montana Legislature to enact a bill “prohibiting, with
certain exceptions, use of land beneath surface waters that do not
satisfy the federal test of navigability for purposes of state
ownership.”129 The bill would allow the use of the beds and banks
of rivers that satisfy the “federal test of navigability for purposes of
the state ownership.”130 In the end, LC 69 was introduced in the
1985 session as HB 16.131
With the failure of the Joint Interim Subcommittee to
recommend viable stream access legislation that did not blatantly
violate the tenets of the Curran and Hildreth decisions, the fate of
successful stream access legislation now rested in the hands of
others. A coalition of groups representing landowners and
agricultural interests, led by Helena attorney Ron Waterman, went
to the Director of DFWP, Jim Flynn, to propose that his coalition
work with DFWP and recreationists on a “compromise bill.” As a
consequence, Mr. Waterman and DFWP attorney Stan Bradshaw
were assigned the task of drafting a bill that would be faithful to the
Curran and Hildreth decisions while addressing many of the
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 32-33.

J. INTERIM SUBCOMM. NO. 2., 49TH LEGIS., HJR 36 WATER
RECREATION STUDY, MINUTES, at 40 (Sept. 28, 1984).
128.
J. INTERIM SUBCOMMI NO. 2, supra 118, at Appendix A.
129.
Id. at i, ¶ (1)(b), Appendix A (LC 69, § 3(2)).
130.
Id. at i, ¶ (1)(c), Appendix A (LC 69, § 3(1)).
131.
H.R. 16, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 7, 1985).
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concerns of landowners.132 The result was HB 265, sponsored by
Representative Bob Ream and supported by the coalition of
agricultural landowners, the coalition of recreationists, and
DFWP.133
HB 265 as introduced134 divided surface waters in two
categories: Class I waters that meet or potentially meet the federal
navigability test for state streambed ownership; and, Class II waters
which are all other surface waters that are not Class I waters. Class
I and Class II waters could be used by the public “without regard to
the ownership of the land underlying the waters,” for all defined
recreational uses the waters are capable of, including the use of the
beds and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark. Some uses of
Class II waters were restricted, such as overnight camping, big game
and bird hunting, use of all-terrain vehicles, and placement of
permanent duck blinds and boat moorages. Recreational use of
stock ponds and ditches was prohibited.
As written, a member of the public could portage around
barriers and the bill established a formal process for establishing
portage routes. The bill also addressed landowner liability,
provided a prohibition on prescriptive easements through
recreational use of surface water, affirmed that the public had no
right to cross private property to access streams, and defined terms,
such as “barrier,” “ordinary high-water mark,” and “recreational
use.” During the session, the organizational structure of the bill
would change, additional terms defined, definitions fine-tuned,
some uses of Class I waters prohibited, and lakes and natural
barriers were excluded. These changes were the subject of
significant debate, but the heart of the introduced bill remained in
the language of the final, adopted bill.
The competing bills were: HB 16 (the subcommittee bill)
that, for all streams that did not meet the federal test of navigability
for state ownership of the beds, prohibited the use of the beds and
132.
Interview with Stan Bradshaw, Former Agency Attorney at
Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Helena (Mar. 28, 2014).
133.
See infra notes. 140, 141, 143 and accompanying text.
134.
H.R. 265, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 18, 1985)
(Introduced Copy).
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banks so that only floating was allowed;135 HB 275 that would
restrict stream access to a pleasure boat test but allowed the use of
the beds and banks thereby ignoring the Supreme Court decisions
in Curran and Hildreth while codifying the district court
decisions;136 and HB 498, that in the same fashion as HB 16,
proposed a Wyoming floating use only with essentially no use of the
beds and bank except on navigable for title rivers.137 HB 16, HB
275, and HB 498 all died in the House Judiciary Committee where
the bills were referred after they were introduced.138 HB 265 was
heard in a joint meeting of the House Judiciary Committee, House
Fish and Game Committee, and the House Agriculture Committee
on January 27, 1985 along with HB 16 and HB 275.139 Ron
Waterman, in written testimony, described the introduced HB 265
as the cooperative effort among landowners, recreationalists, and
the DFWP. The membership of the agricultural and landowner
coalition who supported HB 265 was varied and diverse.140
135.

H.R. 16, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 7, 1985) (Introduced

136.

H.R. 275, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 19, 1985) (Introduced

137.

H.R. 498, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 29, 1985) (Introduced

Bill).
Bill).
Bill).
138.
History and Final Status, H.R. 16, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H.
Bills and Res. 8 (Mont. 1983); History and Final Status, H.R. 275, 48th Legis.,
Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res. 98 (Mont. 1983); History and Final Status, H.R.
498, 48th Legis., Reg. Sess., H. Bills and Res. 178 (Mont. 1983).
139.
H. JUDICIARY COMM., MEETING ON H.R. 16, H.R. 265, H.R.
275, MINUTES, at 1 (Jan. 22, 1985).
140.
The following groups all supported House Bill 265: The
Montana Stockgrowers Association, Montana Wool Growers Association,
Montana Association of State Grazing Districts, Montana Cowbells, Montana
Farmers Union, Montana Cattlemen’s Association, Montana Cattle Feeders
Association, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Montana Water
Development Association, Women involved in Farm Economics, and the
Agricultural Preservation Association. Id. Ex. C at 1, 8 (written testimony of
Ron Waterman). The testimony also identified six major goals of the
agricultural and landowner coalition: “(1) Recognition of private property
rights; (2) Restriction of landowner liability; (3) Identification of the right of
portage around barriers; (4) Limitation upon prescriptive easement to avoid
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The Montana Council of Trout Unlimited, represented by
Mary Wright, testified that the agricultural groups initiated
discussions with the sportsmen’s groups and DFWP with a resulting
agreement on all the major issues raised by the Supreme Court’s
decision.141 The agreed principles were proposed to
Representatives Ream and Marks and embodied in HB 265.142 The
Montana DFWP, represented by Director Jim Flynn, also testified
in support of HB 265, acknowledging HB 265 as “a product of
cooperation between two significant Montana interest groups.”143
The House Judiciary Committee appointed a subcommittee
on stream access bills, with Representative Kerry Keyser selected
as chairman. The subcommittee met six times144 and adopted
proposed amendments to HB 265145 that were then adopted by the
full House Judiciary Committee.146
The subcommittee
amendments adopted by the full House Judiciary Committee
included several important components.147
the loss of land ownership through recreational use activity; (5) a definition of
high water to demonstrate it was the equivalent to the ‘ordinary high water
mark’ of the Natural Streambed Preservation Act; and (6) limitation upon the
public’s use to follow and recreate upon diverted waters.” Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 75-7-101 to 125 (The Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of
1975). H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 139, at Ex. C at 4.
141.
H. JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 139, Ex. D at 1 (written
testimony of Mary Wright).
142.
Id. Ex. D at 1-2.
143.
Id. Ex. E at 3 (written testimony of Jim Flynn).
144.
See generally H. JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON STREAM ACCESS
BILLS, MINUTES Jan. 25, 26, and 29, Feb. 4, 5, and 6, 1985.
145.
Id. at 6 (Feb. 6, 1985).
146.
H. JUDICIARY COMM., EXEC. SESS. ON MONT. H.R. 265,
MINUTES, at 9 (Feb. 12, 1985).
147.
The amendments included a grant of rulemaking authority to
the Commission to consider limits on recreational necessary to protect the
resource and private property; defined what commercial activities would
qualify a river as a Class I water; added a catch-all phrase “other water-related
pleasure activities” to the definition of “recreational use;” added a definition
of “surface water;” that includes the bed and banks; changed the structure of
restrictions on use of Class I and Class II waters from within the definition of
recreational use to a separate section in the bill; prohibited the use of all-
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After passing in the House, the Senate Judiciary Committee
made extensive amendments to HB 265. The primary amendment
added was: “The public has no right to make recreational use of
Class II waters without permission of the landowners.”148 Thus, in a
single sentence the Senate Judiciary Committee voted to eviscerate
the very essence of stream access that the Montana Supreme Court
had held was a public trust right recognized by the 1972 Montana
Constitution. However, the whole Senate adopted amendments to
reverse the heart of the Judiciary Committee amendments.149
In spite of the legislative progress, two troublesome results
of the combination of the dueling amendments remained. The
definition of “recreational use” was amended so that fishing,
hunting, and swimming could not be done “within 100 yards of an
occupied dwelling” and, “recreational use” was further restricted by
removing the catch-all phrase “other water related pleasure
activities.”150
Then Senator Galt proposed an amendment that was
adopted by the Senate to remove from the definition of “surface
water” the part that allowed recreationists to use the bed and bank
of a stream, again turning stream access into a right only to float on

terrain vehicles and other motor vehicles and big game hunting within the
ordinary high-water marks of all surface waters; added rulemaking authority
to the Commission for governing the recreational use of Class I and Class II
waters; and a few other amendments. H.R. 265, 49th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont.
Feb. 14, 1985) (2d Reading).
148.
Id. (Mar. 27, 1985) (S. Judiciary Comm. amendments to 3d
Reading, No. 25).
149.
Id. (Mar. 30, 1985) (S. Comm. of the whole amendments to
3d Reading moved by Sen. Yellowtail). The result of the two sets of Senate
amendments was to: remove natural objects from the definition of “barrier;”
qualify that nothing in House Bill 265 makes portage around natural barriers
lawful or unlawful; state that the recreational use of lakes is not addressed;
restrict camping, placement of permanent duck blinds, boat moorage, etc.
within sight or 500 yards of an occupied dwelling, whichever is less, on Class I
waters; and added authority to the Fish and Game Commission to adopt a
procedure for restricting, on Class II waters, recreational use to the actual
capacity of the water. Id. (April 1, 1985) (Reference Bill).
150.
Id. at § 1(10) (Reference Bill).
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all rivers, including navigable rivers.151 A conference committee
was appointed to address the different Senate and House versions
and recommended that these last three severe restrictions be
removed.152 Both the Senate and House adopted the conference
committee report and when the Governor signed the bill on April
19, 1985, Montana had a stream access law.153
HB 520, that prohibits the recreational use without
permission of any water directed for a beneficial use in irrigation
ditches, drainage canals and ditches, etc., was passed.154 The bill’s
language, but not the meaning, differed slightly from its counterpart
in HB 265 so the two were meshed in Montana Code Annotated §
23-2-301(6) and § 23-2-302(2) and (2)(c) by the Code
Commissioner.155
The 1985 Legislature was perhaps the one and only session
that could have passed a collaborative bill fashioned by both
organizations representing recreationists and organizations
representing landowners, that stayed true to the public recreational
rights guaranteed by the Montana Supreme Court, and that
provided needed definitions and detail while protecting the private
property rights of riparian landowners. Ultimately, eleven stream
access bills were introduced. Three of those that did not pass would
have significantly restricted stream access in direct contradiction of
the Supreme Court decision and five more died because their
content was mirrored in HB 265, or because they were more
restrictive regarding trespass then the legislature was comfortable
with adopting. The two bills that passed in addition to HB 265
supplemented the themes of the compromises underlying the new
stream access law.
The passage of HB 265 must be measured against strong
151.
Id. (March 30, 1985) (S. Comm. of the whole amendments to
3d Reading moved by Sen. Galt).
152.
Id. (April 10, 1985) (Conf. Comm. Rep.).
153.
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1127 (codified at Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 23-2-301 to 322).
154.
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 429, 805 (H.R. 520).
155.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301, 302, Annotation Compiler’s
Comments 7 (2012).

102

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

and repeated efforts prior to and throughout the session to restrict
stream access to floating only. This opposition would have limited
recreational use to the larger river only when there is enough water
to float and would have prohibited fishing while wading. The
political contest started with a restrictive, proposed bill adopted by
the interim committee, survived competing bills in the House,
encountered rough waters in Senate Judiciary Committee and
Senate floor amendments, and was finally resolved by a House and
Senate conference committee. In stark contrast to the attempts to
limit stream access, the new Stream Access Law, with remarkable
simplicity, allows recreational use of all rivers and streams within
the ordinary high-water mark, whether floating, wading, or walking
along the banks, while protecting riparian, private landowners from
trespass above the high-water mark. Thus, in retrospect, the 1985
session can be viewed as representing legislative closure in
establishing Montana’s stream access, but the controversy was not
over.
III. LITIGATION CLAIMING THE STREAM ACCESS LAWS
OF HB 265 WAS A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION
Almost immediately after the 1985 session, another phase in
the evolving saga of stream access was initiated through directly
attacking the newly adopted stream access statutes. The strategy
was to claim that the new law went too far, therefore resulting in an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation. Interestingly, the initial litigation was led by the
principal opponent in the legislature, Senator Jack Galt. This
attack would continue in different forms and venues until just
recently.

A. The Galt Taking Case in the District Court
A number of plaintiffs, Jack Galt and others, filed a
complaint in state district court156 on June 14, 1985157 claiming that
156.

Galt v. State, No. ADV-85-565 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont.

2015

A REMARKABLE ODYSSEY

103

House Bill 265158 was unconstitutional as a taking of private
property without just compensation. The plaintiffs claimed there
was a taking because the new law allowed the public to recreate
using the lands “between the high and low-water mark when there
is no water upon the land and to create portage routes upon the
private lands of plaintiffs above the high-water mark and around
artificial barriers.”159 The complaint asked that HB 265 be declared
“illegal, unconstitutional and void” because it was a taking.160
In the litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the Montana
Supreme Court authorized recreational use only of the “waters and
the streambed under those waters.”161 The plaintiffs relied upon the
language of Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201 which granted
ownership of land to the riparian landowner on a navigable stream
down to the low-water mark. This statute uses “navigable”
meaning navigable for title under the federal test.162 The plaintiffs
made no distinction between navigable for title streams and other
streams where a riparian landowner owns the land to the middle of
the stream.163 The Defendants, State of Montana and DFWP,
responded that HB 265 carefully tracked the Curran and Hildreth
holdings and that both decisions “… declared that there was no
taking of a landowner’s title because his ownership interest was
impressed with a recreational easement,”164 although neither
decision used the word “easement.”
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ claim that HB 265
was unconstitutional, based on the doctrine of stare decisis, because
Feb. 13, 1986) (op. and order).
157.
Id. at 1.
158.
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556, 1227 (codified at Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 23-2-301 to 322 (1985)).
159.
Compl. § VI, Galt, No. ADV-85-565.
160.
Id. at ¶ 1.
161.
Pls.’ Br. in Support of Summ. J. at 16, Galt, No. ADV-85-565
(emphasis in the original).
162.
Gibson, 39 P. 517.
163.
Mont. Code Ann. § 70-16-101; Pls’ Br., supra note 161, at 21.
164.
St.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Br. in Support of
Summ. J. and in Support of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, Galt, No. ADV-85565 (Dec. 2, 1985).
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the issue had already been decided in the Curran and Hildreth
cases where: “the district courts dismissed Curran’s and Hildreth’s
inverse condemnation claims and the Montana Supreme Court
affirmed both decisions.”165 The district court specifically referred
to the Hildreth court’s holding that “[t]he public has the right to use
the waters and the bed and bank up to the ordinary high water
mark. (See Curran.) Further, . . . in the case of barriers, the public
is allowed to portable around such barriers.”166 The district court
compared the Hildreth language to the essentially identical
language in HB 265.167

B. The Galt Taking Case in the Montana Supreme Court
When the case reached the Montana Supreme Court, the
appellants, plaintiffs in the district court (Galt, et al.), asserted that
HB 265 was an unconstitutional taking of property for public
recreational use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and constituted a
taking or damaging of property in violation of Article II, § 29 of the
1972 Montana Constitution.168
More specifically, Galt claimed that the public had rights
only in the use of the water and had no right to use the bed and
banks that were privately owned.169 For non-navigable waters, this
meant the public could not use the streambed and banks.
Therefore, floating only should be allowed. For the larger
navigable for title rivers, or essentially Class I waters as defined in
HB 265, the public could not use, i.e. stand on or wade in, the strip
between the high-water and low-water lines,170 apparently whether
there was water flowing there or not. This meant that a person
165.
Galt, No. ADV-85-565 at 15 (op. and order).
166.
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091) (emphasis in
original).
167.
Id. at 15.
168.
Br. of Appellants at 1, 10, Galt v. State, No. 86-178 (Mont.
1986) (Apr. 28, 1986).
169.
Id. passim.
170.
Id. passim.
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fishing could float and only wade if he or she was deep enough in
the water to be below the low-water line. In addition, and
somewhat in conflict with their overarching argument, Galt also
argued that the enumerated, allowed uses of the high- to low-water
strip on Class I waters were unconstitutional.
Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-301(2) prohibits some
uses on all waters and allows some identified, but qualified uses on
only Class I waters, the specific uses that Galt claimed were an
unconstitutional use of private property: big game hunting with a
long bow or shotgun if authorized by the Commission; overnight
camping if out-of-sight or 500 yards from an occupied dwelling; and
permanent duck blinds, boat moorages, or any seasonal object if
out-of-sight or 500 yards from an occupied building.171 Galt also
objected to the “right” to use a dry streambed as a right-of-way;
however here, Galt misread the statute because this use is
prohibited.172 Galt also claimed it was unconstitutional to allow
portage routes pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-311
over private property around artificial barriers.173 In addition, Galt
asserted that requiring the landowner to pay for the construction of
a portage route was unconstitutional.174
The DFWP responded by arguing that the Legislature
codified the Curran and Hildreth holdings into the statutes enacted
by HB 265. Further, that the Curran and Hildreth decisions got it
right when the court held that the public had the right to recreate
between the high-water marks of all streams capable of recreational
use, and that these rights are guaranteed by the Public Trust
Doctrine as applied to the public use of water by the 1972
Constitution. This includes the use of the beds and banks up to the
high-water mark on all streams and rivers.175
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision, written by Justice
171.
Id. at 4.
172.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(g) (prohibits “use of a
streambed as a right-of-way for any purpose when water is not flowing
therein.” Id.).
173.
Br. of Appellants, supra note 168, at 47.
174.
Id. at 52.
175.
Br. of Resp’t passim, Galt, No. 86-178 (Jul. 31, 1986).
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Morrison,176 was part expected, part unexpected, and quite
confusing. The Court first acknowledged the appellants, Galt et al.,
were requesting that the new stream access statutes, Montana Code
Annotated § 23-2-301 et seq., were unconstitutional as a taking of
private property without just compensation.177 Then the Court held
the statutes were constitutional in accordance with the Montana
Constitution and Curran and Hildreth except for four specific
provisions.178 The Court reaffirmed that the public’s right to use
waters for recreation includes “the bed and banks up to the high
water even though the fee title in the land resides with the adjoining
landowners.”179
The Court then announced a general limitation on the right
to use the bed and bank while recreating that “there is no attendant
right that such use be as convenient, productive, and comfortable or
possible” and “that any use of the bed and banks must be of
minimal impact.”180 The first expression of this limitation seems to
have no practical meaning, while the “minimal impact” is an
appropriate caution. The Court, therefore, reserved to itself the
right to define the kinds of use permissible.181 The Court, acting
much like a subcommittee of the legislature, addressed three uses
of the banks of Class I waters, i.e. rivers either navigable for title or
potentially navigable for title. The Court’s qualifications as it
parsed these uses are important.
The Court found the statute overbroad in allowing camping
where it is not “necessary for the utilization of the water
resource.”182 In other words, a person can camp only where it is
necessary as part of a floating trip. The Court emphasized this by
observing: “The public can float and fish many of our rivers without
camping overnight.”183 The Court also found the construction of
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Galt v. State, 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987) [hereinafter Galt I].
Id. at 913.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 915.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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permanent objects like duck blinds on navigable rivers was
overbroad but, on the other hand, acknowledged duck blinds may
be necessary on large bodies of water.184 Stated another way,
seasonal duck blinds, boat moorages, and other objects are
therefore allowed where necessary on Class I waters.
In contrast, the Court decided big game hunting between
the high-water marks on the larger, Class I waters could not be
“permitted under any circumstances” as a public right.185 In
addition, the Court found that requiring a private landowner to pay
for the construction of a portage route over the landowner’s private
property unconstitutional because “[t]he landowner received no
benefit from the portage.”186 According to the Court, the state
should pay because the public benefits.187
In conclusion, the Court held that private riparian
landowners “have their fee impressed with a dominant estate in
favor of the public.” This easement must be “narrowly confined so
that the impact to beds and banks owned by private individuals is
minimal.”188 The Court in parting said the unconstitutional
portions were severable leaving “the balance of the statute
intact.”189 It is worth noting that this decision only affects the
public’s right to recreate in water flowing through private property.
If the river or stream flows through state or federal property the
Galt I restriction would not apply.
The contentiousness of these questions is seen through the
dissenting opinions of several of the justices. Justice Gulbrandson
would have restricted Class II waters to floating only like Wyoming.
Justices Hunt and Sheehy would both have upheld the
constitutionality of the statutes entirely.190 Both opined that it was
up to the legislature to balance landowner and public rights if

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 916.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 918, 920, 924.
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needed.191 Justice Sheehy sharply focused on the fact that the
majority had restricted public use of Class I banks and streambeds
below the high-water mark whose title, in his opinion, actually
reside in the state, not riparian landowners. Justice Sheehy
reasoned that Montana upon statehood received title to streambeds
up to the high-water mark on navigable rivers,192 citing the United
States Supreme Court in Schively v. Bowlby.193 Therefore, he
believed that the public use of the high to low-water mark is not in
the nature of an easement, but rather under the public trust
doctrine the state owns the strip and may not deed to private
riparian landowners the ownership of part of the streambed.194
Citing the seminal United States Supreme Court case
applying the Public Trust Doctrine to navigable waters that Curran
relied upon,195 Justice Sheehy argued that because the state cannot
transfer control of lands subject to the public trust, the part of
Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201 enacted in 1895 and
purporting to transfer title to the low-water mark on navigable
rivers, was never and could never have been effective.196 Justice
Sheehy could have also have found support in the Enabling Act197
and the 1889 Montana Constitution198 since both arguably would
have required the state to receive fair market value when it was
191.
Id. at 918, 920-21, 923.
192.
Id. at 921.
193.
Schively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1894).
194.
Galt I, 731 P.2d at 921.
195.
Id. at 921-22 (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387).
196.
Id. at 922.
197.
The Enabling Act of 1889, § 11, ¶ 4 requires: “provided,
however, that none of such lands, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever
be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws providing for such
disposition, nor unless the fair market value of the estate or interest disposed
of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law, has been paid
or safety secured to the state.”
198 Mont. Const. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1 required: “and none of such
land, nor any estate or interest therein, shall ever be disposed of except in
pursuance of general laws providing for such disposition, nor unless the full
market value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such
manner as may be provided by law, be paid or safely secured to the state.”
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effected by the enactment of Montana Code Annotated § 70-16-201
to transfer the high to low-water strip to riparian landowners.
Thus, in Justice Sheehy’s opinion, the state in HB 265 was
regulating big game hunting, overnight camping, and construction
of duck blinds on state owned property.199 Justice Sheehy also
noted landowners were permitted to fence across state owned
streambeds in Class I rivers in return for portage routes around
these artificial barriers.200 Therefore, Justice Sheehy would not
have found unconstitutional a requirement that landowners pay for
construction of portage routes around their own fence if the fence
impeded recreational use.201 However, this conclusion would only
apply to navigable for title rivers.
The author hopes to provide a more in-depth discussion and
analysis of whether the state or riparian, private landowners should
actually own the strip between the low and high-water marks on
navigable rivers, citing judicial decisions in other states, and
exploring the ramifications of addressing this issue for the first time
in Montana, in a subsequent publication.

C. The Following Galt II Case on Attorney Fees
Article II, Section 29 of the 1972 Montana Constitution
provides that when a private property owner prevails in litigation
asserting that his or her property was taken or damaged without
just compensation, the private property owner is entitled to be
awarded “necessary expenses of litigation.”202 This includes
attorney fees.203 The plaintiffs in Galt I were award attorney fees
by the district court, which was upheld on appeal by the Montana
Supreme Court.204
The Montana Supreme court affirmed, once again, that the
199.
Galt I, 731 P.2d at 923.
200.
Id. at 924.
201.
Id.
202.
Galt v. State, 749 P.2d 1089, 1090-91 (Mont. 1988)
[hereinafter Galt II].
203.
Id. at 1092-93.
204.
Id. at 1090-91.
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newly enacted stream access statutes were challenged as an
unconstitutional
taking
of
private
property
without
compensation.205 It was important that the Supreme Court was
very clear in what was at stake in Galt I. Only a few, severable
portions of the stream access bill were found unconstitutional206
and, if left standing, would have “served to take private property
without just compensation.”207 The court in Galt I then found the
balance of the statutes constitutional.208
In this litigation (“Galt II”) over attorney fees, the court
found that the requirement for an award of attorney fees was
met.209 Curiously, the Court held Article II, Section 29 authorized
an award of attorney fee “under the particular facts of this case”
and limited “this holding to the facts of this case.”210 Perhaps this
qualifying language reflected the fact that Galt I had upheld the
significant majority of the new stream access law and, with the few
qualified, unconstitutional portions severable, the new law
remained virtually intact.
Throughout the litigation in Galt I, the parties extensively
briefed and identified the central issue of whether the stream access
law was a taking of private property without just compensation
before both the state district court and the Montana Supreme
Court. Although the district court acknowledged and decided this
issue, the Supreme Court barely acknowledged it while addressing
the issue only by inference in Galt I. The Court waited until the
attorney fee issue in Galt II to finally address in one sentence that
the Galt I decision had actually decided the takings issue. This lack
of clarity was frustrating at best and arguably left the issue still
unresolved or, at least, left the issue to a future court to declare that
Galt I had actually decided the issue.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1094 (citing Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916).
Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916; Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1094.
Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1093-94.
Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916.
Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1093-94.
Id. at 1094.
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D. Galt III, A Stream Access Brochure Was Not a Taking
DFWP published an informational brochure on stream
access following the adoption by the legislature of HB 265. The
brochure was revised and republished in April, 1988 to incorporate
the holdings in Galt I.211 The intent of the brochure was to
summarize the rights and responsibilities of landowners and
recreationist regarding the stream access law, Montana Code
Annotated § 23-2-301 through 23-2-322. The same plaintiff group
as in Galt I and Galt II requested a declaratory judgment that the
brochure was unconstitutional and that Montana Code Annotated
§ 23-2-310(12), the definition of surface water that allowed the use
of the beds and banks for recreation, was also unconstitutional.212
The plaintiffs also alleged the entire stream access law was
unconstitutional because the law creates an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection of the law in violation of the United States and
Montana Constitutions by not specifically addressing the
recreational use of lakes.213 The district court dismissed most all
the complaints made by the plaintiff as res judicata because the
parties, subject matter, issues, and capacity of parties were the same
and the issues had been litigated or should have been litigated in
Galt I.214 This included the brochure which was attached as an
exhibit to the complaint in Galt I.215
This left just three provisions in the new brochure that had
been revised in response to the holding by the Supreme Court in
Galt I plus a new allegation regarding camp fires.216 The district
court found that the brochure in two places correctly qualified the
allowance of camping below the high-water mark on Class I waters
211.
DEPT. FISH WILDLIFE & PARKS, STREAM ACCESS IN
MONTANA, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LANDOWNERS AND
RECREATIONISTS, BROCHURE (Apr. 1988) (on file with Pub. Land &
Resources L. Rev.).
212.
Galt v. State, No BDV-88-544, 1-8 (1st Judicial Dist. Ct.
Mont. Aug. 31, 1989) (Dec. and Order) [hereinafter Galt III].
213.
Id. at 6.
214.
Id. at 7-9.
215.
Id. at 8-9.
216.
Id. at 9.
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as “only permissible when it is necessary for the enjoyment of the
water resource.”217 The district court found that in “one small
particular” the brochure appeared to go beyond Galt I by not
explicitly stating that the use of seasonal duck blinds and boat
moorages is allowed only if they are both necessary and are on
large bodies of water.218 After further briefing, the district court
declined to hold that an informational brochure can constitute a
taking.219 In this way, the district court denied the plaintiff was
entitled to attorney fees.220 Thus the litigation over the brochure
ended, and can accurately be described as much ado over nothing.
IV. AG OPINION ON SNOWMOBILING AND TRAPPING
In 1985 following the adoption of the Stream Access Law by
the 1985 Legislation, Attorney General Mike Greehy issued an
opinion on two questions about the reach of the new law.221 He
first held that snowmobiles could not be used on frozen surface
water without landowner permission. This conclusion follows
directly from the language of § 2(2)(a) of Chapter 556 that requires
landowner permission for the use of “motorized vehicles not
primarily designed for operation upon the water.”222 Next he held
that trapping of fur-bearing animals between the ordinary highwater lines of surface waters is not part of the public recreational
rights under the Stream Access Law because trapping is a
commercial rather than a recreational activity.
The definition of “recreational use” does not specifically
include trapping and trapping is not included within the catch-all
phrase “other water-related pleasure activities.”223 Therefore, the
criminal trespass statutes apply to trapping on private land.224 The
217.
Id. at 9-12.
218.
Id. at 14-15.
219.
Id. at 2 (Oct. 26, 1989) (Order on Recons.).
220.
Id. at 2.
221.
Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 41-36 (1985).
222.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(10) (2013).
223.
Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 221, at 138, 140 (citing
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556 1127 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(10)).
224.
Id. at 138, 140-41. See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-6-201 (2013)
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opinion did not make any distinction between Class I and Class II
waters.225 However, for Class I waters that are navigable for title,
reliance on the distinction between recreational and commercial
activities could be questioned.
V. RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION ON
STREAM ACCESS ISSUES (1987-1999)
With the passage of the Stream Access Law and with the
Montana Supreme Court upholding its constitutionality, it would be
logical to conclude that the story ends here. However, this is not
the case as the law will be tested politically, legally, and
administratively over the next 40 years with regulation of
recreational use of rivers and streams and access being the primary
threads of the laws continuing history, along with another test of
the law’s constitutionality in federal court and another challenge in
state court.
This next section, covering the period of 1987 through 1999,
will be relatively smooth sailing with only a couple of challenges to
the Stream Access Law itself and some fine-tuning. However, there
will be a significant transition to comprehensive authority for
government, represented by the Commission, to be able to regulate
recreational use of rivers and streams as needed with growing
recreational use.

A. 1987 Legislative Session
The 1987 Legislature started with a bill to turn the Stream
Access Law on its head by restricting non-navigable for title
streams to floating only, in addition to a bill that claimed to
incorporate the Galt I holding but either would have made

(If private land is posted, landowner permission is necessary. If private land is
not posted, a person has the privilege to enter and remain on private land until
the landowner revokes the privilege by personal communication.); see also
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-6-601 (2013) (nonresident trappers must have written
permission from a landowner).
225.
Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 221, at 139.
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significant changes or was just incomprehensibly ambiguous.
SB 159226 proposed an amendment to the definition of
surface water in the stream access statutes. The public’s right to use
the bed and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark of all natural
water bodies (i.e. all streams capable of supporting recreational
use) is found in the definition in Montana Code Annotated § 23-2301(12). The amendment would have allowed the use of the bed
and banks only if a “body of water has been adjudicated to be
navigable by federal standards.” This would have been an extreme
restriction of stream access by allowing only floating on almost all
rivers and streams in Montana because only a few rivers have
actually been adjudicated navigable for title. Rivers that qualify as
navigable for title, but have not yet been adjudicated would be
restricted to floating without any wading or walking on the beds
and banks. The bill died in the Senate Natural Resources
Committee on a tie vote.227
SB 286 claimed that its purpose was to remove the
provisions declared unconstitutional in Galt I.228 The definition of
recreational use was amended to provide, or at least imply, that any
recreational use may be prohibited by law which would be contrary
to Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I. Next, the public recreational use of
surface water “without regard to the ownership of the land
underlying the waters” was amended to “with regard.”229 The
meaning of this change was unclear, but likely intended to be a
restriction. In addition, the portage provision was extensively
amended.
Although Galt I only required that the state pay for the
physical construction of portage routes, the amendment would have
required landowners to be compensated for the land used for a
portage route, a right the public already had. Finally, distinctions
226.
S. 159, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987) (Introduced Bill).
227.
History and Final Status, S. 159, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res. 62-63 (Mont. 1987).
228.
S. 286, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987) (Introduced bill).
229.
Id. (see amendments proposed in the introduced bill
including changing “without regard” to “with regard” in Mont. Code Ann. §
23-2-302(1)).
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between recreational use of Class I and II were removed without a
discernible reason. The bill was redrafted on the Senate floor to
reasonably reflect the Galt I decision, although without some of
nuance of the Galt I qualifications.230 However, the House
amended SB 286 by reverting to some provisions which were
inconsistent with Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I.231 The Senate did
not concur in the House amendments, the House did not appoint a
free conference committee, and the bill died.232

B. Challenge to a Yellowstone River Rule Based on Safety
Criteria
The following litigation in state district court illustrates the
limitations, prior to 1999, on the Commission’s ability to regulate
conflicts between recreational users of rivers based solely on safety.
When HB 626 was adopted in the 1999 session, it added public
welfare as additional criteria. The Commission’s rulemaking
authority was then dramatically broadened.233
In 1988, the Commission adopted a rule which placed a tenhorsepower limitation on motorboats on the section of the
Yellowstone River from Livingston downstream to Springdale.234
At the time of the adoption of the rule, the Commission had
authority to adopt rules regulating use of public waters based on
health, safety, and damage to property criteria.235
A complaint was filed in state district court asking that the
rule be declared invalid.236 The essence of the complaint was that
230.
Id. (Feb. 25, 1987) (3d Reading).
231.
Id. (Mar. 30, 1987) (Reference Bill).
232.
History and Final Status, S. 286, 50th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res. 110-111 (Mont. 1987).
233.
See Section V, H infra at 50, discussing H.R. 626, 56th Legis.,
Reg. Sess., (Mont. Apr. 20, 1999).
234.
19 Mont. Admin. Reg. 2219 (Oct. 13, 1988).
235.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2) (1987) The Commission’s
criteria to adopt rules regulating recreational use of waters were “in the
interest of public health, public safety, and the protection of property.”
236.
Big Sky Riverboaters, Inc. v. State, No. DV 89-882 (13th
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. June 18, 1989).
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the Commission had not shown that there was a threat to public
safety, the one applicable criteria.237 The Department and
Commission realized the validity of the rule was not supported by
the administrative record because the facts did not support a threat
to public safety. Therefore, plaintiffs, the Department, and the
Commission agreed to settle the litigation, with the Department
and Commission agreeing to redo the rulemaking process to either
repeal, affirm, or modify the rule.238
The Commission at the conclusion the new rulemaking
process decided to retain the rule banning motorboats of greater
than ten horsepower between Livingston downstream to the U.S.
Highway 89 because a threat to public safety was now
demonstrated in this relatively narrow section of the river that
contains a high frequency of rapids. The Commission repealed the
restriction on motorboats between the Highway 89 bridge and the
Springdale bridge because the river was wider with less recreational
use and injury to persons was unlikely.239

C. 1989 Legislative Session
In HB 655, the Legislature passed the Smith River
Management Act which granted DFWP specific authority to
manage and regulate recreational use of the Smith River.240 With
this new statutory authority, the Commission had for the first time
comprehensive authority to regulate recreational use of a river,
limited to the Smith River however, for addressing competing uses
and crowding among different recreational users.

237.

Compl. ¶ 14, Big Sky Riverboaters, No. DV 89-882 (July 21,

1989).
238.
Big Sky Riverboaters, No. DV 89-882 (June 18, 1990)
(settlement agreement); Id (June 18, 1990) (stipulation and order of dismissal
with prejudice).
239.
9 Mont. Admin. Reg. 740 (May 16, 1991).
240.
1989 Mont. Laws ch. 512, 1216 (codified at Mont. Code Ann.
§ 23-2-401 to 410 (1989)).
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D. 1991 Legislative Session
In 1991, the legislative bills were primarily focused on the
use of streambeds and banks. The first, HB 81, was an attempt to
restrict the use of river banks but was tabled in the House Fish and
Game Committee. 241 It would have prohibited overnight camping
and campfires on the banks of Class I waters, and campfires on the
banks of Class II waters (overnight camping was already not
allowed on Class II waters).242 The legislature successfully passed
HB 359 which prohibits the operation of motor vehicles and offhighway vehicles below the ordinary high-water mark on state and
federal land, except where the appropriate land management
agency allows public crossing on designated roads or trails.243
However, the use must have minimal impact on the ecology and the
bed of the stream. Curiously, the prohibition applies to private
lands riparian to Class I waters, but only to the portion of the
streambed covered by water even though the private riparian
landowner owns to the low-water mark, whether covered by water
or not.

E. 1993 Legislative Session Considered Authority to Regulate
Recreational Use
The 1993 Legislature considered two bills to clarify and
expand the authority of the DFWP to adopt and enforce rules
regulating the recreational use of lakes and streams.
The
legislature’s first attempt, SB 341,244 would have granted authority
to the Commission to adopt rules on public reservoirs, lakes,
streams and rivers “to protect and preserve natural resources,
preserve the diversity of recreational opportunities, and minimize
241.
History and Final Status, H.R. 81, 52d Legis., Reg. Sess., H.
Bills and Res. 245 (Mont. 1991).
242.
H.R. 81, 52th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan.1, 1991)
(Introduced Bill).
243.
1991 Mont. Laws ch. 491, 1586 (H.R. 359) (codified at Mont.
Code Ann. § 61-8-371 (2013)).
244.
S. 341, 53d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 1993)
(Introduced Bill).
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user conflicts.”245 The bill would have given the Commission the
authority to establish the need to restrict or adopt quotas on
commercial use to accomplish these goals. The bill was unclear
who, the Commission or the Board of Outfitters, could actually
adopt a quota on commercial use.
This bill was one of the first in a series of attempts to grant
the Commission more comprehensive authority to manage
recreational use of public state waters. The fundamental problem
was that the Commission’s rulemaking authority is limited to rules
affecting only public health, public safety, and the protection of
property, which is very limiting.246 The other bill, SB 297247 would
have amended the Smith River Management Act to limit the
maximum group size to 12; require an annual lottery to selected
authorized outfitters; and prohibit the transfer of individual launch
permits.

F. 1995 Legislative Session
In 1995, the legislature considered HB 348, a rerun of SB
341 of the 1993 Session, which granted the Commission the same
specific authority to regulate recreational use on public waters. The
difference was that the number of outfitters or guides on a river
could be limited by the Board of Outfitting only when the
Commission adopted rules limiting the number of recreational
users on a river.248 The bill was amended to ensure that the
Commission’s rulemaking authority was limited to impacts caused
by recreational users,249 but it failed on the second reading vote in
the House.250

245.
Id. at 3:17-21.
246.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2) (1993).
247.
S. 297, 53d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 2, 1993)
(Introduced Bill).
248.
H.R. 348, 54th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 27, 1995)
(Introduced Bill).
249.
Id. at 2:25, 3:27-28 (Feb. 17, 1995) (2d Reading).
250.
History and Final Status, H.R. 348, 54th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 363 (Mont. 1995).
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G. 1997 Legislative Session
In 1997, SB 149251 represented another attempt to give the
Commission authority to manage and regulate recreational use of
public reservoirs, lakes, streams and rivers, along with a
corresponding responsibility of the Board of Outfitters to regulate
and limit fishing outfitting if necessary. The bill was the product of
a committee composed of members of outdoor recreation groups
and interested persons.252 However the key language was for all
practical purposes identical to HB 348 of the 1995 legislative session
except a negotiated rulemaking process was required. The bill was
amended in the Senate Fish and Game Committee to ensure that
any rules adopted could not restrict the rights of riparian
landowners to access adjacent lakes, rivers, or streams.253 The bill
passed the Senate as amended but was tabled in the House Fish,
Wildlife and Parks Committee.254

H. 1999 Legislative Session – Bridge Access Attempted and
Regulation of Recreational Use Addressed
The 1999 session was eventful with the introduction of the
first of many bills attempting to address access at county bridges
and three bills dealing with recreational use of rivers. The most
significant bill finally gave the Commission full authority to
regulate the recreational use of rivers.
SB 418,255 introduced in 1999, was the first in a series of bills
attempting to address the issue of whether the right-of-ways for
251.
S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 9, 1997)
(Introduced Bill).
252.
Hearing on S. 149 Before the Mont. Sen. Fish and Game
Comm., 55th Legis. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 23, 1997) written testimony of Patrick
Graham, DFWP (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
253.
S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess., at 4:20-23 (Mont. Jan. 29,
1997) (2d Reading).
254.
History and Final Status, S. 149, 55th Legis., Reg. Sess. Sen.
Bills and Res. 77-78 (Mont. 1997).
255.
S. 418, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 1999)
(Introduced Bill).
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county and state roads can be used to access streams and rivers for
recreational use at bridge crossings. The bill declared that
recreational access to streams was not part of a right-of-way or
bridge easement unless specifically stated in an easement document
or unless the state or county has fee title to the right-of-way.256
Rather, bridge easements would be limited to the width of the
bridge except for a “secondary, nonexclusive, and nontransferable
easement” for maintenance and repair.257 As a result of SB 418,
there would have been very little, if any, access at existing bridges.
The bill likely would have led to a significant reduction in access
where a new easement was necessary because many landowners
would resist access as part of a new easement. This invented
concept revising county road easements would appear again and
again, until finally held in error by the Montana Supreme Court.258
There were two significant problems with SB 418, in
addition to prohibiting access to streams and rivers from public
bridge right-of-ways that anglers and floaters had used for decades.
The way the bill was drafted, it appeared to forfeit other necessary
and critical public uses for right-of-ways, such as power lines,
telephone lines or cables, sewer lines, and other similar future uses.
If access to public streams and rivers is already a property right of
the public as part of the easement, then to abandon this public
property right, as the bill would do, would be unconstitutional in
violation of the Montana Constitution Article X, section 11 (1972).
This section of the constitution requires that public land be held in
trust and that public land cannot be disposed of unless fair market
value is received. Also, if legal access to streams and rivers is part
of the public right to use streams and rivers for recreational use,
then to forfeit this access may be unconstitutional as a violation of
the Public Trust Doctrine.259 The bill was tabled by the Senate Fish

256.
Id. at §§ 1, 3, 4.
257.
Id. at § 2.
258.
Pub. Lands Access Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Madison Cnty., 321 P.3d 38 (Mont. 2014).
259.
See supra note 108, referencing the Public Trust Doctrine
adopted by Curran, 682 P.2d 163.
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and Game Committee.260
In an attempt to regulate outfitting on the Beaverhead and
Big Hole Rivers, the legislature considered SB 445.261 The bill was
adopted by the Legislature and would: require outfitters and guides
to have and display boat tags; limit outfitting on the Beaverhead
and Big Hole Rivers based on historic use; prohibit outfitting on
these rivers in a specified section of each river on every Saturday;
require the DFWP to facilitate a consensus process to develop
management plans on the Beaverhead and Big Hole Rivers with
the Commission to adopt the plans through rulemaking; and,
require the adoption of management plans in a similar manner for
other rivers where there is concern about use levels, user conflicts,
resource and property damage, and limited public facilities.262 The
bill required that where a plan called for reductions in recreational
use on a river “the reduction will be made in commercial and
nonresident use rather than in noncommercial, resident use.”263
Because some provisions of the bill, after numerous
amendments, were confusing, contradictory, unclear, and this last
restriction arguably violated the equal protection or the privileges
and immunities clauses of the United States Constitution, Governor
Racicot vetoed the bill.264 The veto was not overridden265 and the
Governor, in the veto message, directed DFWP and Commission to
initiate rulemaking under HB 626 of the same session to address
the issues that were subjects of SB 445. With the passage of HB
626,266 the legislature addressed potential conflicts between
motorboats, personal watercraft and anglers, swimmers, divers, etc.
260.
History and Final Status, S. 418, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res. 237 (Mont. 1999).
261.
S. 445, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 11, 1999)
(Introduced Bill).
262.
Id. (Apr. 21, 1999) (Reference Bill as Amended).
263.
Id. at § 2(5).
264.
Letter from Marc Racicot, Governor, to Bruce Crippen,
Senator, President of the Senate, and John Mercer, Representative, Speaker
of the House, Veto of S. 444 (May 10, 1999).
265.
History and Final Status, S. 445, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess. Sen.
Bills and Res. 249 (Mont. 1999).
266.
1999 Mont. Laws ch. 569, 2544 (H.R. 626).
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by specifying distances of separation, and no-wake zones through
the bill language itself or through rules adopted by the Commission.
The bill prohibits the use of personal watercraft on the upper
Missouri and its tributaries.267
However, by far the most significant amendment in the bill
was a comprehensive expansion of the authority of the Commission
to manage and regulate use of publicly accessible waters of the
state. This was accomplished simply by adding the term “public
welfare” to the statutory scope of the Commission’s rulemaking
authority. The rulemaking authority, as amended,268 reads:
These rules must be adopted in the interest of public
health, public safety, public welfare, and protection
of property and public resources in regulating
swimming, hunting, fishing, trapping, boating,
including but not limited to boating speed
regulations, the operation of motor-driven boats, the

operation of personal watercraft, the resolution of
conflicts between users of motorized and
nonmotorized boats, water-skiing, surfboarding,
picnicking, camping, sanitation, and use of firearms
on the reservoirs, lakes, rivers, and streams or at
designated areas along the shore of the reservoirs,
lakes, rivers, and streams.
(New amendatory
language is italicized.)
The term “public welfare” was amended into the bill in the Senate
Fish and Game Committee.269 As a result, the Commission gained
complete police powers to adopt rules, as contrasted with being
limited to adopting rules for the purposes of public health, public
safety, or protection of property.

267.
H.R. 626, 56th Legis., Reg. Sess., (Mont. Apr. 20, 1999)
(Reference Bill as Amended).
268.
Id. at § 3 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2)).
269.
Id.
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VI. MADISON V. GRAHAM: ANOTHER TAKING
CHALLENGE NOW IN FEDERAL COURT
In May of 2000, a group of plaintiffs filed a complaint in
federal district in Montana seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
Montana Stream Access Law as it applies to the bed and banks of
non-navigable waters, specifically the Stillwater River, Ruby River,
and O’Dell Creek.270 The plaintiffs asserted that the Stream Access
Law violates their Fifteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution right to substantive due process or, in the alternative,
denies their right to due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
plaintiff’s also claimed the statute is void for vagueness.271
The district court started its analysis by applying Ninth
Circuit precedent that the court must view plaintiffs’ substantive
due process claim as a Fifth Amendment takings claim because
there is explicit textual protection under the takings or just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.272 An “as applied” Fifth Amendment claim would
have first required exhaustion of state remedies.273 The court then
stated that the plaintiff have failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, whether a takings claim or a substantive
due process claim, because “Montana’s Stream Access Law clearly
and substantially advances a legitimate government interest and
cannot be said to be irrational or arbitrary”.274 The court continued
a listing of reasons the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed, finding
that the plaintiffs were barred by the 3-year statute of limitations of
Montana Code Annotated § 27-2-204(1) because their claim of a
potential loss of property was triggered by either the passage of
Article IX, Section 3(3) of the 1972 Montana Constitution or the

270.

Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (D. Mont.

2001).
271.
Id. at 1322.
272.
Id. at 1324 (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
273.
Id. at 1324.
274.
Id. at 1325.
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enactment by the Montana Legislature in 1985.275 In addition, The
Court found the plaintiffs are barred by res judicata based on Galt
I, which was a full adjudication performed by a competent court.276
The court relied upon Galt II (the attorney fee phase of Galt I) to
clearly characterize the Galt I decision: “The Galt I plaintiffs
challenged the Montana Stream Access Law ‘as a taking of private
property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 29 of the Montana Constitution.’”277
Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs are also
precluded from asserting their claims by the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine. The doctrine precludes review by a federal district court
of final adjudication of a state’s highest court or to evaluate
constitutional claims addressed in a state court’s decision.278 The
court found that Galt I had reviewed the major federal and state
constitutional challenges to the Stream Access Law and found the
law to be constitutional, except for a few provisions and that the
proper review could have been performed by the United States
Supreme Court, but no appeal was attempted.279 Therefore, the
plaintiffs’ claim for relief was precluded by the federal RookerFeldman Doctrine in addition to being barred by the statute of
limitations and res judicata.280 The court found no merit in
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim asserting that natural barriers were not
addressed in the Stream Access Law and a claim that the definition
of “ordinary high water mark” in Montana Code Annotated § 23-2301(a) was ill-defined.281 The plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed
with prejudice.282
The Ninth Circuit on appeal affirmed the district court
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id. at 1326 (citing Galt II, 749 P.2d at 1090 (attorney fees

phase of Galt I)).
278.
Id. at 1327.
279.
Id.
280.
Id.
281.
Id. at 1327-28.
282.
Id. at 1328.
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decision holding: that the plaintiffs only alleged facts giving rise to a
takings claim; that the right to exclude others is a property right
addressed by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment; and, that
labeling their claim as a substantive due process claim does not
change its nature as a takings claim. Therefore, under Armendariz,
the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a substantive due process
claim and the district court correctly dismissed their complaint with
prejudice.283
The Ninth Circuit did not address several other grounds for
dismissal that the district court found because they were not
necessary to dispose of the case. The Ninth Circuit did however
specifically hold the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not bar federal
court jurisdiction when a federal court litigant was not a party in the
state proceeding, noting that only one of the parties were a litigant
in the state court proceeding, i.e. Galt I.284 The United States
Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari
on May 27, 2003 ending this litigation.285
With the conclusion of this litigation in federal court, the
Stream Access Law had now been upheld against challenges to its
constitutionality in both state and federal courts.
VII.

STREAM ACCESS FROM COUNTY ROADS AT
BRIDGES

Starting with an Attorney General’s Opinion in 2000 that
the public had a right to access streams from county road right-ofways, the issue had a pin ball journey through the 2001, 2005, 2007,
and 2009 legislative sessions culminating in the adoption of HB 190
in 2009 that codified the Attorney General’s Opinion.
To follow the path of the bridge access issue, it is helpful for
the reader to keep in mind two central concepts. One is how to
accommodate both livestock fencing to bridge abutments without
blocking access to streams. The other is which of two competing
283.
Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Armendariz, 75 F.3d 1311).
284.
Id. at 869 n.2.
285.
Madison v. Graham, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003).
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paths to take. One set of bills in the legislature would have virtually
eliminated access by allowing access only if the original road
easement documents specifically stated that stream access was part
of the easement. Of course, this level of detail was not part of the
establishment of easements in the past. The other competing set of
bills would allow both access and livestock fences. However the
devil was in the details, or more accurately in the politics.

A. An Attorney General’s Opinion on Bridge Access at County
Roads
In the latter part of the 1990s, there was a growing
controversy over whether recreationists could legally access streams
at county bridges. In particular, the controversy over bridge access
along the Ruby River in Madison County needed to be addressed
and resolved. A number of fishers and floaters were in complete
disagreement with some riparian landowners over access at county
road bridges to the Ruby River. The recreationists wanted to fish
and float the Ruby River starting and ending at bridge crossings,
but individual landowners wanted to block access from the county
roads.
The history in Madison County starts on September 11,
1995, when the county adopted Ordinance 3-95. This ordinance
essentially provided specific requirements on the use of county road
right-of-ways to allow landowners to fence to bridge abutments and
to allow stream access by the public through the fences. The
ordinance was challenged in state district court, Kennedy v.
Madison County, No. 8483 (Fifth Judicial District Court of
Montana, Madison County, filed May 22, 1996) by some
landowners. Madison County repealed the ordinance on April 4,
1997, to resolve the litigation and because the issue has significant
statewide impact and importance. Madison County and DFWP
decided to request an Attorney General’s opinion as the most
direct and satisfactory way to help settle the issue. 286
286.
Letter from Patrick J. Graham, Director, Mont. Dept. of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks, to Joseph P. Mazurek, Mont. Attorney General with
attached memorandum of authorities at 2-3 (June 11, 1998).
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The DFWP and counties needed guidance to resolve the
issue of whether criminal trespass may occur when the public
accesses streams and rivers at public road bridge crossings.287 The
DFWP requested an AG Opinion on June 11, 1998 and included a
memorandum of authorities supporting a conclusion that the public
can access streams and rivers from the right-of-way of a public road
at a bridge crossing.288 The request suggested that a right of access
needs to be qualified in two ways. That the counties need to have
authority to have control over roads as needed for safety and
parking and that prescriptive use roads could be limited to uses that
establish the roadway.289 The DFWP characterized public access at
bridges “as a fundamental and inherently necessary part of the
public’s constitutional right to use Montana’s streams and rivers for
recreational purposes.”290 Madison County also requested that the
Attorney General resolve the issue although the county did not
take a position or advocate a conclusion.291
On June 2, 2000, Attorney General Mazurek issued his
opinion holding:292
1. Use of a county road right-of-way to gain access
to streams and rivers is consistent with and
reasonably incidental to the public’s right to travel
on county roads.
2. A bridge and its abutments are a part of the
public highway, and are subject to the same public
easement of passage as the highway to which they
are attached. Therefore, the public may gain access
to streams and rivers by using the bridge, its right-ofway, and its abutments.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id., letter at 1, mem. at 1.
Id., letter at 2, mem. at 25.
Id., letter at 2, mem. at 25-26.
Id., mem. at 25.
Id., mem. at 3.
Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 48-13 (2000).
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3. A member of the public must stay within the road
and bridge easement to gain access to stream and
rivers. Absent definition in the easement or deed to
the contrary, the width of a bridge right-of-way
easement is the same as the public highway to which
it is attached.
4. Access to streams and rivers from county roads
and bridges is subject to the valid exercise of the
county commission’s police power and its statutory
power to manage county roads.
5. Access to streams and rivers from county roads
and bridges created by prescription is dependent
upon the uses of the road during the prescriptive
period.
In the text of the opinion, Attorney General Mazurek
recognized the connection between access at bridges and the
public’s constitutional right to use all streams and rivers capable of
recreational use.293 In summary, Attorney General reasoned that
using a public right-of-way, the road, to access a stream or river,
which is another public right-of-way, “is consistent with and
reasonable incidental to the public’s right to travel on county
roads.”294 However, the opinion was erroneous in holding that the
uses of prescriptive roads depended on the uses during the
prescriptive period.295

B. Bridge Access Attempted in the 2001, 2005, and 2007
Legislative Sessions
The 2001 controversy centered around a recurring theme:
293.
Id. at 4.
294.
Id. at 5.
295.
Id. at 1, holding 5; Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 4454 (use of a prescriptive road is for all public road purposes although the width
of the right-of-way depends on use during the prescriptive use period).
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access to county bridges. The apparent intent of HB 528296 was to
codify a portion of the Attorney General’s (“AG”) opinion that the
public can generally access streams and rivers from county right-ofways at bridge crossings.297 However, the AG did recognize that
this access “is subject to the valid exercise of the county
commission’s police power and its statutory power to manage
county roads.”298 The AG found that the authority of county
commissions to control the use of roads is for the purpose of safety
and parking.299
HB 528 would have faithfully codified the portion of the
AG’s opinion dealing with control of county roads for safety and
parking, with one exception. The last amendatory sentence in the
introduced bill arguably went much further by authorizing county
commissions to restrict public access to waterways at bridge
crossings “if the restrictions are related to public health, safety, or
welfare.”300 This authority might have allowed county commissions
to go beyond the primary focus of the bill by closing off access at
their discretion. The sentence was amended out in the House State
Administration Committee.301 The bill passed out of the committee,
but died on second reading in the House.302
The 2005 Session continued the controversy of fences for
livestock control at bridges where the same fences can prevent or
inhibit public access to the underlying stream. Two bills failed, one
that ignored the potential for fences to be barriers while the other
was overreaching. However, the most significant bill, which
prevents the abandonment of public access to public waters, passed.
If passed, HB 133 would have allowed a landowner to
extend a fence from the road right-of-way to a county road bridge
296.
H.R. 528, 57th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 9, 2001)
(Introduced Bill).
297.
Mont. Atty’y Gen. Op., supra note 292.
298.
Id. at 1.
299.
Id. at 8.
300.
H.R. 528, supra note 296 at 2:3-5 (Introduced Bill).
301.
Id. at 2:3-5 (2d Reading).
302.
History and Final Status, H.R. 528, 57th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 512 (Mont. 2001).
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abutment.303 A fence could be used to control livestock or it could
be constructed to obstruct or prevent access to a stream. The bill
was opposed because of the latter potential purpose.304 An
amendment was prepared for the purpose of requiring that the
fence would not block public access.305 The bill was then tabled in
the House Local Government Committee.306
The most significant stream access bill of the 2005 session
was HB 269.307 An existing statute already required that where a
county road which provides access to public land is abandoned,
another public road must provide “substantially the same access.”308
The same requirement applied for state highways.309 Because the
public has an easement to use the bed and banks for recreation,310
under these circumstances, both statutes may already have applied
if the easement for recreational use qualifies as public land.
However, there was a growing controversy and concern over when
a county road may be rerouted and where access is restricted in an
agreement with the landowner at the new bridge right-of-way.311
HB 269 amended both statutes to provide or clarify that
when a county or state highway right-of-way provides existing legal
access to public water, including access for recreational use, and the
road or highway is abandoned, another road or highway must
303.
H.R. 133, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Dec, 20, 2004)
(Introduced Bill).
304.
Open FAX from MGTU to DFWP (Jan. 17, 2015) (copy on
file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
305.
H.R. 133, supra note 303 (prepared amendments HB 13301
ads for Rep. Clark) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
306.
History and Final Status, H.R. 133, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 276 (Mont. 2005).
307.
H.R. 269, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 11, 2005)
(Introduced Bill).
308.
Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2615 (2005).
309.
Mont. Code Ann. § 60-2-107 (2005).
310.
Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916.
311.
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 269 Before the S. Comm. on Fish
and Game, 59th Legis. Sess. (Mont. Mar. 8, 2005) (written testimony of M. Jeff
Hagener, Director, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L.
Rev.).
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provide substantially equivalent access.312 Therefore legally, and in
theory, when a county road is rerouted with a new bridge at a new
location, there must be access to the stream or river from the new
bridge right-of-way. The bill passed and was signed by the
Governor.313
During the same session, another bill in an ongoing effort to
address access at bridges was considered. Bridge access legislation
starting with SB 148 in 1999 would continue in numerous bills until
finally HB 190 passed in 2009. Generally, the issues were stream
access at bridges and fences as potential barriers to access.
HB 560,314 as introduced, proposed to codify the Attorney
General’s opinion that county road and bridge right-of-ways
provide public access to stream and rivers. The Attorney General
Opinion holdings were proposed verbatim.315 Pursuant to Montana
Code Annotated § 23-2-311(2), landowners are allowed to fence
across streams to control livestock or manage property. However,
this bill would authorize the DFWP to abate dangerous or
hazardous fences across streams so that floaters would not be
harmed or their property damaged.316 The bill also would grant
authority to the DFWP to issue declaratory rulings on whether: a
stream is capable of recreational use; whether a particular surface
water is off-limits to public recreational use because it is a stock
pond or private impoundment; or, whether a particular surface
water is off-limits because it is a ditch diverting water for beneficial
use.317
Extensive amendments were considered, primarily
addressing landowner fences from the edge of the right-of-way to
bridge abutments. The amendments would have conditioned the
312.
H.R. 269 59th Legis., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Mont. Mar. 23, 2005)
(Enrolled Copy) (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2615(3)); Id. at § 2
(amending Mont. Code Ann. § 60-2-107(4)).
313.
2005 Mont. Laws ch. 168, 591.
314.
H.R. 560, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 5, 2005)
(Introduced Bill).
315.
Id. at §2, 3; Mont. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 292.
316.
H.R. 560, supra note 314, at 2:22-27.
317.
Id. at §3.
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fences by requiring that public access to the streams or rivers was
substantially the same as existed prior to the erection of the
fence.318 The bill died in the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks
Committee.319
The 2007 Session was particularly frustrating for the efforts
to resolve the dilemma of fences and access at county bridges, with
the failure of all four bridge access bills that were introduced. A
reasonable conclusion is that the opposing factions were not yet
ready to compromise.
SB 78320 as introduced in 2007 was controversial. As
introduced, SB 78 allowed fences to angle from a landowner’s fence
on the right-of-way line to a bridge abutment for the purpose of
controlling livestock. However, the fence could not make access to
the underlying stream more “difficult or dangerous than without
the fence.”321 There were provisions for cost reimbursements to
landowners who added gates, stiles, or other methods to ensure
public access. The Board of County Commissioners and DFWP
could alter or remove a fence that did not qualify, and an
arbitration process was set out to resolve disputes.322 The bill also
attempted to codify the AG’s Opinion that the recreating public
could access a stream or river at bridge crossings.323
FWP worked with county Commissioners, Trout Unlimited,
the Montana Wildlife Federation and others to draft amendments
to address concerns with the language in the introduced bill.324 The
amendments were adopted by the Senate Fish and Game

318.
Id. (March 15, 2005) (proposed amendments HB 056007,
ads) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
319.
History and Final Status, H.R. 560, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 415 (Mont. 2005).
320.
S. 78, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Dec. 12, 2006)
(Introduced Bill).
321.
Id. at §§ 1(4), 3(1)(b).
322.
Id. at § 3, at 2-10.
323.
Id. at § 2.
324.
Hearing on S. 78 Before the S. Comm. on Fish and Game,
60th Legis. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 18. 2007) (written testimony of Chris Smith,
Chief of Staff, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
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Committee and rewrote the bill.325 The revised bill would allow a
fence that did “not prevent public access or provides improved
access.” “Prevent public access” was defined in the bill as a fence
that creates a barrier or makes access more difficult.326 The other
provision of the introduced bill remained essentially intact.
When the bill got to the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks
Committee, the Committee amended the bill, not only to gut it, but
to gut the holdings of the AG’s Opinion as well. The most
egregious amendment from the viewpoint of supporters of stream
access, was to prohibit access at bridges except when the road or
bridge easement itself specifically allowed recreational users to
access the stream or river.327 In practical terms, this meant there
would be no public access unless the landowner allowed it.
Immediately following the adoption of these amendments, the bill
was tabled.328
This is an appropriate place to describe why fences to bridge
abutments matter. From a landowner’s perspective, the most
practical fencing to control livestock is to fence directly from the
fencing along the right-of-way to the bridge abutment. However,
under Montana Code Annotated § 7-14-2134, such a fence across
the county road easement would be illegal as an encroachment. In
spite of the illegality, landowners have traditionally fenced to the
bridge abutment. The other option, the legal one, would be to
continue fencing across the stream along the right-of-way line. This
fencing would be more difficult to construct and most likely would
need to be repaired or replaced after each spring run-off.
From the perspective of recreationists, especially those
floating, a fence upstream or downstream of a bridge is a
potentially dangerous hazard, especially at higher flows. Further,
325.
S. 78, supra note 320 (2d Reading).
326.
Id. at §§ 2(7), 4(1)(b)(ii).
327.
S. 78, supra note 320 (Mont. April 3, 2007) (3d Reading)
(amendments SB 007801 ads sponsored by Rep. Chas Vincent, for the House
Fish, Wildlife and Parks Comm. The critical amendment was number 18.)
(copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
328.
History and Final Status, S. 78, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res. 46 (Mont. 2007).

134

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36

fences to the bridge abutment can be an obstacle to access and,
sometimes, potentially hazardous. This is the dilemma that
supporters of stream access at bridges had, up to 2007, been trying
unsuccessfully to resolve. In the abstract it is an easy problem to
solve, but politically, the issue divided supporters of stream access
from those who oppose or desired to limit stream access.
In another attempt to restrict access at bridge crossings, HB
329
642 would have allowed access only where stream access was
expressly stated in a petition or dedication creating the right-of-way
or was acquired by condemnation.330 The restriction also applied to
any other uses of the county road right-of-way except for
maintenance of the bridge. This meant that all other county uses of
the right-of-way, e.g. telephone lines or fiber optic cables, would
stop at any bridge crossing. The sponsor, Representative Milburn,
then proposed an amendment with a substitute concept: no access
at a county bridge unless there is “a court order declaring a
particular bridge site as a legal access point.”331 The result would
be no access at county bridges except where access was successfully
litigated as legal in bridge-by-bridge determinations. The bill was
tabled in the House Fish, Wildlife and Parks Committee.332
When the legislature successfully removed the $500,000
limit on a county’s road and bridge capital improvement fund with
the passage of HB 426,333 the Governor returned the bill with
proposed amendments that codified the AG’s Opinion on bridge
access. The amendments allowed fencing to bridges to control
livestock if the fence was the “least restrictive to the public’s ability
to access a stream or river.” The county board of commissioners, in
329.
H.R. 642, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 12, 2007)
(Introduced Bill).
330.
Id. at § 1 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2112).
331.
Id. (Feb. 15, 2007) (amendments HB 64201.ads requested by
Rep. Milburn for the H. Fish, Wildlife and Parks Comm. The critical
amendment was No. 6). (copy on file with the Pub. Land & Resources L.

Rev.).
332.
History and Final Status, H.R. 642, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 428 (Mont. 2007).
333.
H.R. 426, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 2, 2007)
(Introduced Bill).
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consultation with the DFWP, could impose conditions ensuring
public access.334 The Governor’s amendments were not adopted by
the legislature, the originally adopted bill was then returned to the
Governor who signed the bill.335 As a result, statutory resolution of
access at bridges would wait for the next session.

C. 2009 Legislative Session Finally Resolves Bridge Access
The positive result of the 2009 session was to finally resolve
legislatively the issue of access at county bridge crossings by passing
HB 190. The practical and simpler bill compared to a competing
bill, HB 26.
HB 26336 proposed to resolve access to streams at county
bridges; however, HB 26 was more complicated than HB 190 with a
detailed process than was unnecessary. HB 190 was simpler and
more direct and was the product of a collaborative group that
included representatives of recreationists, landowners, and
counties. Also, HB 26 left it up to the discretion of county
commissions whether or not to require public passage through
fences that were otherwise barriers.337 The bill was tabled in the
House Fish, Wildlife and Parks Committee.338
Of all the bills proposed addressing stream access at county
bridges, HB 190339 was the most straightforward, practical and the
least complicated. A landowner was allowed to fence to a bridge
334.
Letter from Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Mont., to Scott
Sales, Speaker of the House, and Mike Cooney, President of the Mont. Senate
(April 11, 2007) (returning HB 426 with proposed amendments) (copy on file
with Pub. Land and Resources L. Rev.).
335.
History and Final Status, H.R. 426, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
H. Bills and Res. 365. (2007 Mont. Laws ch. 380, 1645).
336.
H.R. 26, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Nov. 25, 2008)
(Introduced Bill).
337.
Id. at § 2(2)(a) (Board of County Commissioners only
required to “take any action necessary”).
338.
History and Final Status, H.R. 26, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., H.
Bills and Res. 235 (Mont. 2009).
339.
H.R. 190, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 7, 2009)
(Introduced Bill).
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abutment for the purposes of controlling livestock and for property
management if the fence provided for public passage to an
underlying stream for recreational use. The new statutory language
included a list of acceptable ways to provide for public access, such
as a stile, gate, roller, walkover, or a wooden rail fence that
provides for passage. If there was a dispute, DFWP would
negotiate a solution with the landowner or just install a suitable
access modification to the fence. DFWP pays for the fence
modification necessary to provide public passage.340
A qualifying fence would not be an encroachment pursuant
to Montana Code Annotated § 7-14-2134 as amended.341 Most of
the AG’s Opinion on bridge access was codified, including a Senate
Fish and Game Committee amendment that added a qualification
that the bill did not “create or extinguish” any right to use a road
established by prescriptive use.342
Further amendments in the Senate Fish and Game
Committee included limiting landowner liability for persons using
road and bridge easements to access streams, to acts or omissions
that constitute willful or wanton misconduct, and that providing one
access feature on each side of a stream may be sufficient.343 HB 190
reflected months of collaborative and constructive dialog among
many interests.344
The bill passed both the House of
Representatives and Senate by near unanimous votes and was
signed by the Governor.345

340.
Id. at § 3.
341.
Id. at § 1 (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2134).
342.
Id. at § 2(1)-(3) (Mar. 27, 2009) (2d Reading, 2d House as
amended).
343.
Id. at §§ 2(4), 3(2)(b).
344.
Hearing on H.R. 190 Before the S. Comm. on Fish and
Game, (Mont. Mar. 19, 2009) (written testimony of Bob Lane, Chief Legal
Counsel, DFWP) (copy on file with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
345.
History and Final Status H.R. 190, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., H.
Bills and Res. 298 (Mont. 2007). These passed and approved amendments to
the Stream Access Law. 2009 Mont. Laws ch. 201, 1685 (codified at Mont.
Code Ann. § 23-2-312 (§ 2 of H.R. 190) and at Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-313 (§
3 of H.R. 190)).
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THE BRIDGES OF RUBY RIVER – THE CAPSTONE
OF BRIDGE ACCESS

The issue of public access at county bridges and roads,
where the public road right-of-way was established by prescription,
was largely resolved by the Montana Supreme Court in Public Land
Access Association v. Board of County Commissioners346 as it
addressed a dispute and controversy over access to the Ruby River
at Seyler Lane and Seyler Bridge. The other significant issue in the
case was over whether the district court’s ruling that the public
could access the Ruby River from a right-of-way granted by deed at
Lewis Lane road and bridge was an unconstitutional taking of
private property.347
The Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (“PLAA”)
sought a declaration, starting with a complaint filed May 2004, that
the public could access the Ruby River from three roads and
bridges: Duncan District Road established by statutory petition;
Lewis Lane established by grant or dedication; and Seyler Lane
established by prescriptive use.348 The district court of Madison
County denied the public access from Seyler Bridge and Seyler
Road but granted the public access from Lewis Bridge.349
Unique to this litigation, the parties stipulated that Seyler
Bridge and Seyler Lane is a county road right-of-way that was
established by prescriptive use.350 The district court split the county
right-of-way for Seyler Lane into a public right-of-way for just the
traveled portion and a wider secondary easement limited to the
county for maintenance and repairs that is separate from the public
road right-of-way.351
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that a prescriptive
road does not have a secondary easement for maintenance and
repair but, rather, the public right-of-way includes “the areas
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Pub. Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
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necessary to support and maintain the road, as well as land needed
to make the road safe and convenient for public use.”352 The Court
distinguished public road easement case law from cases involving
private easements.353 The Court agreed with authorities from other
states, that the width of a county road extends beyond the traveled
way.354
The Court then turned to the width of a prescriptive road,
holding that the minimum sixty-foot road width otherwise required
by statute355 does not apply to prescriptive use roads.356 The
“character and extent” of its use, the land necessary to support and
maintain the road, and “historical evidence of the nature of the
enjoyment by which the public acquired the right-of-way” are the
factors the district court, on remand, was directed to consider in
determining the width of Seyler Land, a prescriptive use road.357
The width “must be sufficient to encompass the incidents necessary
to enjoying, supporting and maintaining the roadway.”358
The Court found that recreational use could be considered
as a factor in determining the width of the right-of-way acquired by
prescriptive use. However, the evidence of recreational access to
Ruby River will need to pre-date the 1985 statute prohibiting
prescriptive use across private property to reach a stream.359
Recreational use would need “to be established through clear and
convincing evidence for the requisite statutory period.”360
The next holding of the Supreme Court was the most
significant. The Court did not limit road usage to the historic uses
establishing the right-of-way but to uses incident to the historic use
and those “that are reasonably foreseeable.”361 This would include

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id.
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43-44.
Mont. Code Ann. § 7-14-2112(1).
Pub. Lands Access, 321 P.3d at 44-45.

Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46 (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 23-2-322(2)(b)).
Id.
Id. at 49.
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foot travel, including access to the Ruby River as reasonably
foreseeable.362 By defining the scope of public prescription roads to
include all reasonable foreseeable future uses for a public roadway,
the decision made prescriptive public roads useful as public roads
into the future, rather than a liability for a county. For example, if
a road is limited to historic uses, installing buried power lines or
telephone lines would not be possible without the permission of
every landowner along the way or condemnation every time a new
use is made of the road.
The last issue was raised by Mr. Kennedy, a landowner at
Lewis Lane and Bridge, who intervened in this litigation.363 Specific
to this issue, the county road deed for Lewis Lane dedicated the
right-of-way to public use whether in the form of a fee or
easement.364 Regardless, Mr. Kennedy claimed the right of use that
was granted never intended recreational access to the Ruby River.
Second, he claimed the district court’s decision allowing access at
Lewis Lane was an unconstitutional taking of private property
because he owned the riverbed underlying the public right-ofway.365
The court held that a grant of a right-of-way is for those
public uses “known at the time of the dedication, but also to those
justified by a lapse of times and change of conditions.”366 In
summary, the grant was for all public highway purposes, then and in
the future.
On the second issue, the Court found no taking for two
reasons. Kennedy’s predecessor had granted the “swath of riverbed
underlying the bridge and within the right-of-way to the public.”
Second, citing to Curran, Hildreth, and Galt I, it is “settled law in
Montana that the public may use the beds of non-navigable rivers,
up to the high water mark, for recreation.” Therefore, by
precedent, recreational “public use does not constitute
362.
Id.
363.
Id. at 40.
364.
Id. at 50-51.
365.
Id. at 50.
366.
Id. (citing Bolinger v. Bozeman, 439 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Mont.
1972) (quoting Wattson v. Eldridge, 278 P.236, 238 (Cal. 1929)).
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compensable taking of private property.”367 The Court observed
that the Montana Constitution “provides the state owns the water
for the benefit of its people, and places no limits on their use.”368 In
light of this provision, the public use right is described as not an
interest in the landowner’s property, but as a physical reality that
“some ‘minimal contact’ with the banks and beds of rivers is
generally necessary.”369
The Court distinguished ownership of the water and its use
from ownership of the underlying land: “Some insignificant use of
the riverbeds and river banks is, and always has been, necessary to
the public’s use and enjoyment of its resource. That use does not
amount to an easement or any other ‘interest’ in land.”370 The
Court referred to Hildreth to conclude, “that no taking of private
property occurs in public use of beds and banks of waters up to the
high water mark because title does not pass with the use right.”371
The Court summarized its holding: “Kennedy never owned a
property right that allowed him to exclude the public from using its
water resource, including the riverbed and banks up to the highwater mark. Nothing has been taken from him.”372
This Ruby River access decision is notable for the nature of
the issues it resolved and the manner in which it was accomplished.
In this decision, established prescriptive use roads are recognized as
county roads for all public road purposes now and in the future.
The decision means that county commissioners do not face a
dilemma over the management and use of a county road that was
never formally dedicated because of a narrow limitation on public
use. The court also affirmed that a county road acquired in a
367.
Id. at 51 (citing Curran, 682 P.2d at 171; Hildreth, 684 P.2d at
1091; Galt I, 731 P.2d at 916).
368.
Id. at 52 (citing Mont. Const. art IX, § 3(3)).
369.
Id. (referencing Galt I, 731 P.2d at 915).
370.
Id. at 53; see Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-309 (“The provisions
of this part and the recreational uses permitted by 23-2-302 do not affect the
title ownership of the surface waters, the beds, and the banks of any navigable
or non-navigable waters or the portage routes within the state.” Id.).
371.
Pub. Lands Access, 321 P.3d at 53.
372.
Id.
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formal manner, such as a dedication, grant or condemnation, can be
used for all public road purposes now or in the future. Importantly,
public use now includes access to streams.
Except for the detail of the width of a prescriptive road,
PLAA just capped the saga of public access to streams at county
bridge crossings with final legal recognition. As a final bonus, the
Montana Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Michael
Wheat, has carefully, explicitly and definitely explained that the
Stream Access Law is not a taking of private property. The
previous Montana Supreme Court decisions with similar holdings
lacked the clarity and completeness of PLAA.
IX. THE MITCHELL SLOUGH – DITCH OR BRANCH OF
THE BITTERROOT RIVER
The story of the Mitchell Slough has state-wide implications
because irrigators on one side of a braided river historically have
attached their headgate and ditch to the near side-channel as they
are physically constrained to do. Therefore, the physical
circumstances of Mitchell Slough are replicated in other rivers. The
issue was whether or not the side-channel itself can be converted to
a privately owned “ditch,” albeit a “fishing ditch.”
The controversy over the status of the Mitchell Slough was
finally resolved by the Montana Supreme Court373 finding that the
Mitchell Slough qualifies as a natural, perennially flowing stream
subject to the jurisdiction of the Natural Streambed and Land
Preservation Act of 1972, commonly known as the 310 Law, and is
subject to stream access and public recreation as provided by the
Stream Access Law.374 This dispute had been going on for years
with some landowners riparian to Mitchell Slough, and their
representatives, insisting the watercourse should be called “Mitchell
Ditch.”
The Mitchell Slough is in Ravalli County east of the
Bitterroot River between Hamilton and Stevensville. It leaves the
373.
Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. Bitterroot
Conservation Dist., 198 P.3d 219 (Mont. 2008).
374.
Id. at 232, 242.
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East Fork of the Bitterroot River meandering in a
north/northeasterly direction for approximately fifteen miles before
rejoining the Bitterroot River, having first split into an east and a
west channel. The Mitchell Slough’s original confluence with the
East Fork was supplemented by a concrete diversion structure
constructed by the three primary ditch companies in 1915. Later
the ditch companies in the 1940’s constructed the Tucker headgate
a quarter-mile upriver on the East Fork and dug a quarter-mile
canal to reconnect the East Fork to the Mitchell Slough’s channel,
all to ensure a dependable water flow in the Mitchell Slough.375
This review will concentrate primarily on the stream access
issue, although the 310 Law and stream access issues are linked
together procedurally. The Bitterroot Conservation District, in an
administrative declaratory ruling process, determined that the
Mitchell (the courts sometimes referred to the watercourse as the
Mitchell rather than Mitchell Slough or Mitchell Ditch) was not a
natural perennial - flowing stream subject to the 310 Law.376 This
decision was appealed to the Twenty-First Judicial Court, Ravalli
County, by the Bitterroot River Protective Association (“BPPA”),
but the Montana DFWP did not appeal the decision of the
Bitterroot Conservation District. BPPA’s complaint in district
court also claimed the Mitchell Slough was open to recreational
access under the Stream Access Law. Groups of landowners
intervened, along with three primary irrigation companies, Etna
Ditch, Webfoot Ditch, and Union Ditch. Some of the landowners
cross-claimed for a declaration that the Mitchell Slough was not
subject to the Stream Access Law. DFWP was joined as an
involuntary plaintiff for the Stream Access Law issue.377 Both
BRPA and DFWP appealed the district court’s decision holding
that the Mitchell Slough was not subject to stream access.378 Thus,
the two issues were joined in one case.
In the end, the district court’s holding that Mitchell Slough
was not subject to the 310 Law was reversed by the Montana
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 223, 238-39.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223.
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Supreme Court.379 Although this was a significant decision by the
Court, the subject of this article is the Stream Access Law. Thus,
the thrust of this section will concentrate on that issue.
The following are the significant facts that the Supreme
Court relied upon:
The Mitchell Slough was designated as the “Right Fork of
the St. Mary’s Fork of the Bitterroot River” on the 1872
Government Land Office (“GLO”) survey map and remains in
partially the same location as in 1872.380 “Certain portions of the
Mitchell Slough have been rerouted, redirected, and controlled by
humans to the extent that the Mitchell Slough does not follow the
same path it may otherwise have naturally followed without
intervention.”381 There was enough water in Mitchell Slough to
supply water to the Union, Etna, and Webfoot irrigation ditches in
the 1800’s.382 The Etna Ditch and headgate was constructed and
connected to Mitchell Slough in 1871, the Union Ditch in 1889, and
the Webfoot Ditch in 1871.383 The present day flows in the Mitchell
Slough in the non-irrigation season were measured in a February
2001 U.S. Geological Survey, starting with a flow of 18.2 cubic feet
per second (“c.f.s.”) at the closed Tucker headgate and ending with
a discharge of approximately 60.49 c.f.s. back into the Bitterroot
River from the east and west channels and Brushy Creek (a third
braid of Mitchell Slough) for an increase in flow of about 42.25
c.f.s.384
The Court defined the task before it as follows:
Three statutory phrases of the SAL (Stream Access
Law) are at issue and must be satisfied for the
379.
Id. at 233.
380.
Id. at 224.
381.
Id.
382.
Id. at 238-39.
383.
Br. of Involuntary Pl. and Appellant Mont. Dept. of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks at 5, Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d 219 (Nov.
15, 2006) (citing trial exhibits based on the Ravalli County Water Resources
Survey).
384.
Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d at 239.
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Mitchell to be subject to public recreational use.
They are essentially as follows: that the Mitchell is 1)
a natural water body 2) capable of recreational use
and 3) not diverted away from a natural water body
through a manmade conveyance system - one of the
SAL’s exceptions.385
The Court started with an acknowledgement that “whether
the Mitchell is a natural water body for purpose of the SAL is
ultimately a conclusion of law.”386 The Court concluded “that the
district court’s dictionary-based definition which essentially
requires a pristine river unaffected by humans in order to be
deemed “natural,” results in an absurdity: for many Montana
waters, the SAL would prohibit the very access it was enacted to
provide.”387 The Court then stepped through an analysis first of the
nature of water in Mitchell Slough that in some way had been
influenced by humans through upriver diversion and ditch systems,
resulting in irrigation waste water and return flow that the district
court considered “artificial” and “not natural.”388 The Court
concluded “the Mitchell serves as a watercourse from which such
water can be again appropriated” requiring “the conclusion that the
Mitchell is a watercourse flowing in a ‘natural channel.’”389
Next the Court considered whether the Mitchell Slough is
“a manmade conveyance system” that becomes an exception to
public stream access if the system carries water for a beneficial
use.390 The Court reasoned that Mitchell Slough was certainly a
385.
Id. at 236-37.
386.
Id. at 237.
387.
Id. at 238.
388.
Id. at 239.
389.
Id. at 240.
390.
The language of the statutory exception and incorporated
definition set out the required elements: “(2) the right of the public to make
recreational use of surface waters does not include . . . (c) the recreational use
of waters while diverted away from a natural water body for beneficial use
pursuant to Title 85, Chapter 2, part 2 or 3,” and Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2301(6)(a) (2005): “‘Diverted away from a natural water body’ means a
diversions of surface water through a constructed water conveyance system,
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natural water body 130 years ago, that Mitchell Slough has been
altered but that it had not “lost its original natural character by such
work and was transformed into a ‘manmade’ conveyance system.
Man-improved, certainly, but not man-made.”391 The Court cited
the “healthy, breeding fish population” found by the district
court392 and the fact that the water flows through Mitchell Slough
year-round, not just during the irrigation season393 as elements in its
ultimate conclusion that Mitchell Slough is subject to stream access
and public recreation.394
In summary, the Mitchell Slough decision, at least for a sidechannel branch of a river before the intervention of humans, holds
that the watercourse cannot be altered by man into a ditch, that all
waters, in the watercourse, including return flows from irrigation,
are part of the “natural flows” of a “natural water body” for
purposes of the Stream Access Law. Also, to qualify as a
constructed ditch carrying irrigation water, the ditch should flow
with water only during the irrigation season. In addition, the Court
held that the presence of a healthy fishery helps to define a stream
capable of recreational use.

A. Legislative Attempts to Nullify the Mitchell Slough Decision
Almost immediately there was an attempt to undo the
Mitchell Slough decision in the 2009 Session and then again in the
2011 Session. However, both bills failed because they attempted to
assert that a stream altered by humans or a stream with return flows
from irrigation is not a natural water body, arguments that were
rejected by the Montana Supreme Court.395
In the 2009 Session, SB 314 would have had the effect of
exempting many, if not the majority, of the smaller Class II streams
including but not limited to: (a) an irrigation or drainage canal or ditch.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(c) (2005).
391.
Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d at 240-41.
392.
Id. at 241.
393.
Id. at 241-42.
394.
Id. at 242.
395.
See Id. at 219.
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from qualifying as surface water in which the public has the right to
recreate. 396 The definition of surface water in the Stream Access
Law is “a natural water body.”397 The amendments in SB 314
would mean that any stream that had been altered by humans, for
example controlling the flow with a headgate or similar device or
changing the course of a stream so that it remains connected to an
irrigation ditch, would no longer be a “natural water body.”398
Also, any water in a stream that was once diverted for irrigation
and has returned to a stream must be excluded from the natural
flow of a stream to determine a qualifying theoretical flow.399 The
result could be that streams in basins with significant irrigation may
have a zero theoretical flow, therefore, would not be “natural” and
would be off-limits for stream access. The bill had every
appearance of an attempt to reverse the Mitchell Slough decision.
After discussion with supporters and opponents of the bill, Sponsor
Senator Laible requested that the bill not be heard by the Senate
Natural Resources Committee. As a consequence the bill died.400
Nevertheless, in the 2011 Session there was another attempt
to overrule the Supreme Court’s Mitchell Slough decision. HB
309401 would have replaced the present clear language in the stream
access statutes that describe ditches that are off-limits to
recreational use. The stream access statutes define a ditch as a
constructed water conveyance system used to divert water for a
beneficial use.402 HB 309 would have replaced this clear and
effective protection for landowner irrigators with new dense,
murky, and confusing language that would allow private individuals
to privatize side-channels of braided rivers and streams and,

396.
S. 314, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 1, 1009)
(Introduced Bill).
397.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-1-301(12).
398.
S. 314, supra note 396, at 2:13-18.
399.
Id. at 2:16-18.
400.
History and Final Status, S. 314, 61st Legis., Reg. Sess., Sen.
Bills and Res. 135 (Mont 2009).
401.
H.R. 309, 62d Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 21, 2011)
(Introduced Bill).
402.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301(6), 302(2)(c) (2009).
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perhaps, whole streams. For example, some kind of control
structure is placed at the head of the side-channel and at some point
along the side-channel there is an actual headgate for a real ditch
leaving the side channel, then the former live side-channel would
become a private ditch pursuant to HB 309.403 Also return flows
would count as water diverted, and when the total return flows
from all irrigation in a river basin are the majority of the flow in a
river or stream, the river or stream would no longer be public.404
For example, the water diverted from the Bitterroot River during
the irrigation season is three times the actual flow of the river with
the result that the flow in the river primarily comes from return
flows.405 The proposed amendments in HB 309 also define a stream
altered by humans as qualifying as a ditch,406 although the point at
which there would be enough alteration would be a subject of
debate, i.e. future litigation.
An examination of the proposed amendatory language
adding a new subsection (2)(c) to Montana Code Annotated § 23-2302, justifies the above conclusions. Admittedly, the language in
the amendments is difficult to follow; however, an interpretation of
the language is facilitated by the facts that these are the very
arguments that the landowners proposed in an attempt to turn a
live side-channel of the Bitterroot River, Mitchell Slough, into a
private fishing ditch. The Montana Supreme Court resoundingly
rejected these arguments.407
The bill passed the House of Representatives but it was
eventually tabled in the Senate Agricultural, Livestock and

403.
H.R. 309, supra note 401, at § 2 (amending Mont. Code Ann.
§ 23-2-302(2) by adding subsection (c)).
404.
Id. (amending Mont. Code Ann. § 32-2-302(2)(c)(ii) to § 232-302(2)).
405.
Hearing on H.R. 309 Before the Sen. Comm. on Agriculture,
Livestock and Irrigation Comm., 62d Legis. Sess., ¶ 3 (Mont. Mar. 8, 2011)
(written testimony of Bob Lane, Chief Legal Counsel, DFWP) (copy on file
with Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
406.
H.R. 309, supra note 401, at §1 (amending Mont. Code Ann.
§ 23-2-301(6)).
407.
Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n, 198 P.3d 219.
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Irrigation Committee.408 This author recalls that over three
hundred citizens attended the Senate Committee hearing with
approximately one hundred testifying in opposition to HB 309, and
only a handful testified in favor of the bill.
X. AFTER 28 YEARS THE LEGISLATURE AMENDS THE
STREAM ACCESS LAW TO INCORPORATE THE
HOLDINGS OF GALT I
It has taken the legislature 28 years to incorporate the
holdings of Galt I409 into the Stream Access Law. The first attempt
was SB 286 in the 1987 Session, but the effort was plagued by
ambiguous language that may have resulted in significant changes
to the law and by a failure to accurately capture the Galt I
holdings.410
In the 2007 Session, HB 721411 was apparently intended to
amend the stream access statutes to codify the Galt I412 decision.
However the bill as drafted failed to accurately follow the
qualifications within the Galt I decision and added at least one
sentence that could be in violation of the underlying Curran and
Hildreth413 decisions. The sentence stated: “Any use of real estate
that is adjoining the water is allowed with permission or contractual
agreement with the landowner.”414 If the term “water” means land
down to the low-water mark, the sentence would have violated the
holdings of the Curran and Hildreth decisions that allow the use of
the bed and banks. The bill was tabled in the House Fish, Wildlife
and Parks Committee.415
408.
History and Final Status, H.R. 309, 62d Legis., Reg. Sess., H.
Bills and Res. 307 (Mont. 2009).
409.
Galt I, 731 P.2d 912.
410.
See Section V, A supra at 44-46, on the 1987 Legislative
Session.
411.
H.R. 721, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Feb. 15, 2007)
(Introduced Bill).
412.
Galt I, 731 P.2d 912.
413.
Curran, 682 P.2d 163; Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088.
414.
H.R. 721, supra note 411, at 3:24-25 (emphasis added).
415.
History and Final Status, H.R. 721, 60th Legis., Reg. Sess.,
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Finally in 2015, the Legislature considered for the first time
a bill, SB 232,416 that was narrowly drafted with its only objective to
codify the holdings of the Galt I decision.417 The bill prohibits any
big game hunting between the high-water mark of Class I rivers,
requires DFWP to pay for the construction of portage routes, and
allows camping and seasonal duck blinds and boat moorages only
where necessary for the enjoyment of a Class I river. The bill was
passed unanimously.418
XI. PPL MONTANA – A NAVIGABLE FOR TITLE CASE
The final significant decision is one by the United States
Supreme Court that by its own terms does not affect Montana’s
Stream Access Law. However, in opining on the federal test for
state ownership of navigable riverbeds, it is a cautionary tale of “be
careful what you ask for.” The decision is significant because, in
clarifying the criteria by which rivers or river segments qualify as
navigable for title, there was the potential for an impact on stream
access in Montana.
In PPL v. Montana, the State of Montana was claiming that
PPL Montana, LLC (“PPL”) was liable to the state in the form of
rent for the use of riverbeds where PPL had constructed and
operated 10 hydroelectric facilities. Five of the hydroelectric dams
were on Upper Missouri River along the Great Falls reach, two
facilities further up river in canyons on the Stubbs Ferry reach, and
two dams in steep canyons on the Madison River, which collectively
are called the Missouri-River Project. The remaining hydroelectric
dam is on the Clark Fork River and is called the Thompson Falls
Project.419
Montana’s claim to compensation for the use of the
H. Bills and Res. 449 (Mont. 2007).
416.
S. 232, 64th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mont. Jan. 28, 2015)
(Introduce Bill).
417.
Galt I, 731 P.2d 912.
418.
2015 Mont. Laws ch. 327 (S. 232) (amending Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 23-2-302, 311).
419.
PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1218-19.
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riverbeds depends on its assertion of ownership of the riverbeds.
This assertion itself turns on whether or not the rivers at the
location of the hydroelectric dams are navigable for title purposes.
The state district court ruled that Montana owned the riverbeds and
that PPL owed the state approximately $41 million in rent for the
use of the riverbeds between 2000 and 2007.420 The Montana
Supreme Court affirmed.421 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari,422 reversed the judgment, and remanded.423
The key issues were the Montana Supreme Court’s
approach that “navigability for title purposes is very liberally
construed,”424 justifying assessing a river’s navigability as a whole
with short interruptions, rather than assessing the navigability of
the segments where the dams were located.425 The second issue was
the weight and relevance of the present-day use of the Madison
River in determining navigability.426
The Court, in reviewing the controlling legal principles
stated: federal law governs questions of navigability for state
riverbed title;427 under the Equal Footing Doctrine, a state takes
title to the beds of navigable rivers within the state upon the
statehood;428 and the determination is of navigability is based on the
“natural and ordinary condition” of the water at the time of
statehood.429
In determining title to a riverbed, the U.S. Supreme Court
“considers the river on a segment-by-segment basis to assess
whether the segment of the river, under which the riverbed in

420.
Id. at 1225-26 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 229 P.3d
421, 440, 442-43 (Mont. 2010)).
421.
PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 460-61.
422.
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (mem.).
423.
PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
424.
Id. at 1226 (citing PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 446).
425.
Id. (citing PPL Mont., 229 P.3d at 446, 449.).
426.
Id. at 1233.
427.
Id. at 1227 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75
(1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
428.
Id. at 1227-28.
429.
Id. at 1228.
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dispute lies, is navigable or not.”430 Incidentally, the Court clarified
that the need to portage around a river segment “may defeat
navigability for title purpose”431 and concluded “the 17-mile Great
Falls reach, at least from the head of the first waterfall to the foot of
the last, is not navigable for purposes of riverbed title under the
Equal-Footing Doctrine.”432 Citing evidence in the record, the court
determined there is “significant likelihood” that some of the other
reaches where the dams are located may fail the federal test of
navigability for title and remanded for the Montana courts to assess
these reaches in compliance with the principles the court
discussed.433
The Court also found error in the Montana Supreme
Court’s reliance on present day use of the Madison River as
“probative of its susceptibility of use at statehood,” because there
was no analysis that modern watercraft are comparable to the
capabilities of the watercraft available at the time of statehood, and
no analysis of whether the condition of the river had changed since
statehood.434 Therefore, “reliance upon the state’s evidence of
present-day, recreational use, at least without further inquiry, was
wrong as a matter of law.”435
The Court expressed its view of the equities of Montana’s
claim for compensation. The Court noted Montana filed a claim for
riverbed rent over a century after the first dam was built, the state
was fully aware of the hydroelectric projects, had participated in the
federal licensing process of the dams, and knew that PPL had paid
rents to the United States.436 The Court said that Montana’s long
failure to assert title is some evidence for concluding the river
430.
Id. at 1229. The Court cited United States v. Utah,
summarizing the conclusions of that case “that the Colorado River was
navigable for its first roughly 4-mile stretch, non-navigable for the next
roughly 36-mile stretch, navigable for its remaining 149 miles.” Id. (quoting
Utah, 295 U.S. at 73-74, 79-81, 89).
431.
Id. at 1232.
432.
Id. at 1232.
433.
Id. at 1232-33.
434.
Id. at 1233-34.
435.
Id. at 1234.
436.
Id. at 1235.
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segment was non-navigable.437
However, the real significance of this case for stream access
is the court’s response to Montana’s suggestion that denying the
state title to the riverbeds would undermine the public trust
doctrine supporting stream access.438 The Court dismissed this
suggestion as a misunderstanding of the Equal Footing and Public
Trust Doctrines.439 The Court in a clear distinction between
respective authority of federal and state law stated:
While equal footing cases have noted that the State
takes title to the navigable waters and their beds in
trust for the public, the contours of the public trust
do not depend upon the Constitution. Under
accepted principles of federalism, the States retain
residual power to determine the scope of the public
trust over waters within their borders, while federal
law determines riverbed title under the equalfooting doctrine.440
The PPL Montana decision does not affect access to streams
in Montana under Montana’s very inclusive Stream Access Law. It
does however give license to other western states if they choose to
expand and clarify their stream access laws while balancing access
with private property rights and interests.441
Under the Montana Stream Access Law all “surface waters
that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public
without regard to the ownership of the land underlying the
waters.”442 There is however some difference in allowed incidental
and necessary use of the bed and banks between Class I waters
437.
Id. at 1235.
438.
Id. at 1234 (citing Br. for Resp’t., 20, 24-26, PPL Mont., 132
S. Ct. 1215 (Oct. 27, 2011) (2011 WL 5126226).
439.
Id. at 1234.
440.
Id. at 1235 (internal citation omitted).
441.
Nathan Damweber, PPL Montana v. Montana: From Settlers
to Settled Expectations, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 163, 193 (2013).
442.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(1).
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(larger rivers) and Class II waters (the smaller rivers or streams). 443
Class I waters are generally defined consistent with waters that are
navigable for title under the federal test. However, in at least one
aspect, the Class I definition is broader because it includes waters
“capable of supporting . . . commercial guiding using multiperson
watercraft.”444 Therefore, the Madison River is a Class I water for
the Stream Access Law although it may or may not be navigable
under the federal test for state ownership of the bed.
XII.

LITIGATION ILL ADVISED – A CAUTIONARY
TALE

Sometimes issues are not prepared to properly be decided
by courts until they are sufficiently framed by facts. The following
is an example of such litigation. This case is presented as a
cautionary tale of a case that could have ended badly for the
potential scope of stream access.
When Robert L. Ryan was denied permission to fish in Lois
Lake, he filed a complaint for declaratory relief to gain access to
the lake.445 Lois Lake was created in about 1966 when an earthen
dam was constructed on Snowshoe Creek. The Third Judicial
District Court of Montana, Powell County, denied his claim of
access on the ground that Lois Lake can be accessed only by
crossing private property that Ryan did not have permission to
cross.446 Ryan appealed, pro se, to the Supreme Court making two
claims. He claimed that he could reach Lois Lake without crossing
private property and that Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-310, by
excluding lakes from the Stream Access Law, denies the public of
the right to use lakes, such as Lois Lake, for recreational purposes
and is, therefore, unconstitutional.447
The Supreme Court only reached the first issue, concluding
443.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2), (3).
444.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(2)(c).
445.
Ryan v. Harrison & Harrison Farms L.L.L.P., 306 Mont. 534,
slip op. at 1 (Mont. 2001).
446.
Id. at *8.
447.
Id. at *3.
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that Lois Lake was entirely surrounded by private property and
thus, Ryan had no right to cross private property to recreate in Lois
Lake.448 Ryan argued that he could access Lois Lake from
Snowshoe Creek Road. However, the Supreme Court found that
Ryan could not get to Lois Lake from Snowshoe Creek Road
without crossing private property because the road right-of-way did
not reach the ordinary high-water mark of the lake.449 Ultimately,
the Court did not reach the merits of Ryan’s constitutional
challenge because Ryan had failed to timely serve the Attorney
General or name the state as a party, thereby waiving his
constitutional challenge.450
Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-310 says: “Nothing
contained in this part addresses the recreational use of surface
waters of lakes.”451 It is clear then that the statute does not address
whether or not the public has a right to recreate in lakes, including
man-made impoundments on live streams. The Supreme Court did
note that Lois Lake is a man-made, artificial lake, “entirely on
private property and used for watering stock and for irrigation
purposes” and said the definition of “surface water” limits public
recreational use to “natural” waterbodies.452 However, this was
clearly dicta. The Court did not discuss the limitation on
recreational use of waters “while diverted away from a natural
water body for beneficial use.”453 Nor did the court consider the
statutory definition of “lake” that includes surface water retained
by “artificial means.”454 Nor was the prohibition on public
448.
Id. at *4.
449.
Id. at *6.
450.
Id. at *8; see Mont. Code Ann. § 27-8-301 (1935) (requires
service on the Attorney General when a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional). See Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(d) (1999) (required service on the
Attorney General when the constitutionality of a statute is questioned unless a
state agency is a party. This rule was replaced in 2011 by Mont. R. Civ. P. 5.1,
which requires service on the Attorney General when the constitutionality of a
statute is challenged.).
451.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-310 (emphasis added).
452.
Ryan, 306 Mont. Slip op. at 4.
453.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(c) (emphasis added).
454.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-301(7).
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recreational use in a “stock pond or other private impoundment fed
by an intermittently flowing natural watercourse” considered.455
A reservoir on a live stream fits the definition of lake but is
not created by diverting water away from the stream. Any issue of
the status of a reservoir on a live stream, as contrasted with a
storage reservoir on private land created by diverting water from a
live stream through a constructed ditch, was not decided in this
case. Thus, a reservoir on a live stream could meet the test of
Curran and Hildreth as public water supporting recreational use.
None of these arguments were raised nor considered in the Court’s
dicta. It is telling that the Montana Supreme Court classified their
decision as noncitable.456
When Mr. Ryan contacted the DFWP asking for support, he
was advised that the factual circumstances surrounding Lois Lake
offered a very weak framework for raising such an important issue
with consequent risks that better, more compelling facts would
avoid. Mr. Ryan was encouraged not to appeal.457
XIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF STREAM ACCESS

A. Introduction
The political and public support of stream access depends
upon a fair and even-handed administration of recreational use of
streams and rivers under the Stream Access Law. This includes
implementation of bridge access at county roads, determinations of
necessary portage routes, limitations where recreational use is
damaging to stream ecology or riparian land, and the adoption of
use regulations to preserve the enjoyment of the resource. For
these reasons, it is important to examine the year-to-year
administrative efforts by the Commission and DFWP.

455.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(2)(b) (emphasis added).
456.
Ryan, 306 Mont. slip op. at 1 (classified pursuant to Mont.
Sup. Ct. Internal Operating R. § 1, ¶ 3(c)).
457.
Telephone interview with Robert L. Ryan, Plaintiff, Ryan v.
Harrison, Helena, Mont. (March 2000).
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B. Implementation of Bridge Access at County Roads Pursuant to
HB 190
HB 190458 resolved the dilemma of providing for public
access at county bridges through landowner fences that encroached
across the right-of-way by angling up to the bridge abutment which
is the most practical way to control livestock.459 The legislation
established that recreationists have the right to access streams from
county road right-of-ways and adjacent landowners have approval
to attach fences to bridge abutments provided there is public
passage through the fence to the stream.
DFWP is required to negotiate with landowners to decide
on the type of public access that is needed, such as a gate, stile,
roller, walkover, wooden fence rail or other appropriate structure.
The new statute sets out a simple process to resolve any
disagreements between DFWP and a landowner. DFWP, with the
cooperation and contribution of any interested parties and
landowners, provides the materials, installation, and maintenance
of a public passage modification to a fence.460
As documented in a memorandum to Regional Supervisors,
DFWP started implementing HB 190 in 2009 by establishing
guidelines and working with groups and landowners on bridge
access projects.461 A glitch in access at bridges developed when the
Montana Department of Transportation (“MDT”) was constructing
a new county bridge at a different location that required the
acquisition of a new road right-of-way. MDT was negotiating new
right-of-ways in some cases with landowners who wanted to limit
public access in the right-of-way agreement with MDT.462 The issue

458.
2009 Mont. Laws ch. 201, 1685 (codified at Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 23-2-312, 313 (2009)).
459.
See Section VII, C, supra 66-67, on 2009 legislation.
460.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-312.
461.
Mem. from Dave Risley, Mont. DFWP, to Regional
Supervisors, Bridge Access (June 23, 2010) with attached Guidelines for
Bridge Access Procedures and Objectives (June 2010).
462.
Mem. from Harvey E. Nyberg and Bob Lane to Jeff
Hagener, Director, DFWP, Loss of Public Access at Bridges, (Aug. 29, 2001).
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was in limbo for some time until MDT adopted a policy for
addressing stream access at highway crossings.463
The policy is divided into two parts. Where no additional
right-of-way is required or needed, MDT will construct similar
access to that which existed with the old bridges.464 However,
where an additional or new right-of-way is required, the policy then
says MDT will “acquire sufficient right-of-way to construct the
facility for a highway purpose” and, when the right-of-way is for a
county road easement, MDT “will attempt to preserve existing
access by terms of the easement.”465 This policy can be construed
to have meant that river or stream access at new right-of-ways for
county roads will not be obtained if the landowner does not agree
to access. However, “highway purpose” now clearly includes all
present and future road uses, including access to streams at road
and highway bridge crossings.466
Further MDT is prevented from abandoning access at the
old bridge crossing unless replacement access is provided.
Specifically, the county or MDT cannot abandon access at a county
road or state highway to “public land or waters, including access for
public recreational use . . . unless another public road or right-ofway provides substantially the same access.”467 The Stream Access
Law, as amended by HB 190, says that the public may access rivers
and streams at a public bridge and county road right-of-way.468
Therefore, MDT should be required to not just “attempt” to
preserve existing access but to actually preserve existing public
access. Perhaps, and hopefully this is what MDT is now doing.

463.
Mem. No. 02-01 from Joel Marshik, Acting Chief Engineer
MDT, to All Offices, Stream Access at Highway Crossings (Mar. 1, 2002).
464.
Id. at ¶ 5.A.
465.
Id. at ¶ 5.B (emphasis added).
466.
Public Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38.
467.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-14-2615 (3), 60-2-107(3).
468.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-312 (1).
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C. Portage Routes Pursuant to the Stream Access Law
The Montana Supreme Court and the Montana Legislature
have addressed barriers in streams and rivers that may otherwise
interfere with the public’s access along the corridor between the
ordinary high-water marks. The public is allowed to portage
around barriers by going above the ordinary high water mark” in
the least intrusive way possible, avoiding damage to the private
property holder’s rights.”469 The Stream Access Law makes the
same allowance for portage around artificial barriers, but also
specifically acknowledges the right of the landowner to create
barriers, such as fences, across streams for land or water
management, such as the control of livestock.470 In addition, there
is a process for establishing portage routes when necessary.
This more formal process for establishing portage routes
around or over man-made barriers is assigned to the board of
supervisors of a soil conservation district, the directors of a grazing
district, or the board of county commissioners.471 As a last resort,
there is an arbitration process.472 The Stream Access Law does not
specifically address portage around natural barriers because
barriers are only defined as “artificial obstruction.”473 DFWP is
responsible for the cost of any portage route construction and
maintenance.474
Initially, there were only twelve requests for establishing
portages. Seven were initiated in 1985 and five in 1986. Ten of the
requests had been or were being handled directly between the
DFWP and the landowner. The Department has provided signs,
assisted in rearranging fences, provided float gates, etc. Two of the
requests were handled through the local conservation districts. For
example, a bridge over the Beaverhead River was raised to permit
469.
Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
470.
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-301(1), 311(1), (2).
471.
Id. at §§ 23-2-301(11), 311(3)(a)-(d).
472.
Id. at § 23-2-311(3)(g)-(i).
473.
Id. at § 23-2-301(1).
474.
Galt, 731 P.2d at 916; Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-311 (as
amended by 2015 Mont. Laws ch. 327 (S. 232)).
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boat passage and reduce associated dangers. This result was due in
large part to the efforts of the Beaverhead Conservation District.475
Since this early period, most all portage routes have been
established by the DFWP and landowner working together.476
These principles and statutory provisions ensure that the recreating
public has access and is not barred from using streams and river
while recognizing and protecting the rights of private landowners.

D. Regulation of Recreation Use of Streams and Rivers by
Administrative Rule or Order
The Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Commission has the
authority to adopt rules regulating the recreational use of streams
and rivers, lakes, and reservoirs,477 and the authority to adopt rules
for procedures to consider petitions for orders to limit, restrict, or
prohibit recreational use of surface waters, or to limit the use of a
Class II stream to its capacity for recreational use.478
The general rulemaking authority pursuant to Montana
Code Annotated § 87-1-303 can be exercised to adopt annual or
biennial seasonal rules,479 under an exception to Montana
475.
Mem. from James W. Flynn, Director, Review of Activities
Related to Stream Access, DFWP. (Dec. 1986) (copy on file with Pub. Land &
Resources L. Rev.).
476.
Interview with Jim Darling, Fisheries Division, DFWP,
Helena, Mont. (Mar. 2014).
477.
Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-301(1)(b), (c) (Commission
authority to adopt to adopt fishing regulations and rules governing use of
water under the jurisdiction of the DFWP); Mont. Code Ann. § 87-1-303(2)
(specific authority of the Commission to adopt rules regulating recreation use
of public fishing reservoirs, public lakes, rivers and streams “in the interest of
public health, public safety, public welfare, and protection of public property
and public resources.”).
478.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-302(5) (authority to adopt rules for
procedures to considering orders to limit, restrict or prohibit recreation use of
surface waters and to restrict recreational use of identified Class II waters to
the determined actual capacity of the water.).
479.
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-4-102(11)(b)(iv) (annual or biennial
fishing or seasonal recreational use rules are not rules subject to the more
formal rulemaking requirements of the Mont. Admin. Procedures Act
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Administrative Procedure Act (“MAPA”), or to adopt
Administrative Rules of Montana (“ARM”) pursuant to the more
formal requirements of MAPA.480
All rulemaking, whether
seasonal rules or ARM rules, and all orders restricting use or
limiting use on a stream must meet all notice, opportunity to
participate, and open meeting requirements of the Montana
Constitution and implementing statutes. This section will detail
examples of key rulemaking or orders of the Commission.

E. Restriction on Outfitting Use of the Big Hole and Beaverhead
Rivers
Following the veto of SB 445 by Governor Racicot in
1999, the Commission initiated rulemaking on the Beaverhead
and Big Hole Rivers to address increased user conflicts, resource,
and property damage concerns, demands on limited public facilities,
and the quality of the recreational experience concerns.482 The rules
were adopted June 29, 1999 as an interim biennial rule, the biennial
rule was amended on January 12, 2000, and adopted as a biennial
rule on May 2, 2001.483 The Fishing Outfitters Association of
Montana filed a complaint in district court in Gallatin County on
January 7, 2002 challenging the adopting of the biennial rule on
procedural, jurisdictional, and constitutional grounds,484 during the
pendency of the litigation the Commission adopted the rules as
ARM under MAPA effective April 25, 2003.485
The 18th Judicial Court upheld the rules finding: that the
Commission had authority under Montana Code Annotated § 87-1481

(MAPA)).
480.
Montana Administrative Procedures Act, Mont. Code. Ann.
§§ 2-4-101 to 711.
481.
See summary of S. 445, supra notes 261-65 and
accompanying text.
482.
24 Mont. Admin. Reg. 3462, 3465 ¶ 4 (Dec. 26, 2002).
483.
Fishing Outfitters Ass’n of Mont. v. Mont. Fish, Wildlife and
Parks Comm’n., No. DV-02-32 (8th Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. Aug. 14, 2002)
(certification of admin. r.).
484.
Id. (Aug. 4, 2004) (dec. and order); Id. (Aug. 17, 2004) (j.).
485.
8 Mont. Admin. Reg. 759 (Apr. 24, 2003).
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303 to adopt the rules; that the Commission met or exceeded
procedural and substantive requirements of MAPA; that the
restrictions in the recreational use rules against nonresidents do not
violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution;
and the rules do not violate the Land and Water Conservation
Fund, 16 U.S.C. §§ 406e-4 et seq.486
The structure of the rules is to limit outfitters to their
documented historic use prior to 1999. On the Beaverhead River,
the river is divided into five reaches with each eligible outfitter
limited by an allowed number of launches per day based on historic
use in each reach. In addition, there are two different designated
reaches where in one of the reaches float fishing by nonresidents
and float outfitting is not allowed on Saturday and the other reach
has the same restriction on Sunday. The rules apply from the third
Saturday in May through Labor Day.487
The Big Hole River is divided into eight river zones with the
headwater zone closed to float outfitting and in the other seven
zones, one zone is closed to outfitting each day with the zone that is
restricted on Saturday and the zone that is restricted on Sunday
also closed to float fishing by nonresidents. As on the Beaverhead
River, the rules apply from the third Saturday in May through
Labor Day.488

F. Biennial Smith River Rules
The Smith River Management Act was adopted by the
legislature in 1989.489
The Act was administered by the
Commission until July 1, 2013 when the State Parks and Recreation
Board (“Board”) was created and delegated the responsibility to

486.
Fishing Outfitters Ass’n, No-02-32 (dec. and order). Appeal
to the Montana Supreme Court was withdrawn and dismissed. Id. (Dec. 20,
2004) (withdrawal of appeal), dismissed by, No. 04-808 (Mont. Dec. 21, 2004).
487.
Mont. Admin. R. 12.11.205, 12.11.215 (2010).
488.
Mont. Admin. R. 12.11.210, 12.11.220 (2010).
489.
Smith River Management Act, 1989 Mont. Laws ch. 512,
1216 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-401 to 410).
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manage the Act.490 The Commission, and now the Board, is
charged with regulating and allocating “recreational and
commercial floating and camping to preserve the biological and
social benefits of recreational and commercial use of the Smith
River waterway in its natural state.”491 The Board may set
recreational and commercial user fees, allocate recreational use,
including outfitting, through a permit system, restrict use to
preserve the experience while considering landowner tolerance, the
capacity of the river, and minimizing user conflict and providing for
a level of solitude.492
The Commission has used its authority to adopt biennial
rules setting private and commercial float trip fees, allocating
private float trips through a random lottery for the time period of
April through October 31, limiting the number of commercial
outfitted float trips per year, requiring floaters to camp at
designated boat campsites, prohibiting dogs on float trips, and
restricting fires to metal fire rings.493 The rules apply to the use of
the Smith River from Camp Baker downriver approximately 60
river miles to Eden Bridge. Camp Baker and Eden Bridge are the
only public access in this stretch of the river, so floaters must camp
at designated public boat camps and must complete the trip unless
they have landowner permission to leave the river. This makes the
Smith River somewhat a unique experience and helps to explain the
enactment of specific statutes for its management.494

490.
2013 Mont. Laws ch. 235, 816 (H.R. 24) (established the
State Parks and Recreation Board and changed the Fish, Wildlife and Parks
Commission to the Fish and Wildlife Commission. Ch. 235 assigned the
responsibilities for state parks to the Board that were formerly part of the
Commission’s responsibilities).
491.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-408(1).
492.
Mont. Code Ann. § 23-2-408.
493.
MONT. STATE PARKS BIENNIAL SMITH RIVER RULE, FEES
AND RULES FOR SMITH RIVER STATE PARK AND RIVER CORRIDOR (adopted
Mar. 11, 2015), available at, http://stateparks.mt.gov/smith-river/).
494.
Fishing Access Sites on Smith River, MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE
AND PARKS, http://fwp.mt.gov/fishing/searchResults.html?siteId=111479047
4133&q Type=waterStream&siteType=FA (last visited June 21, 2014).
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G. Petitions to Restrict Use Stream-by-Stream
The Commission has adopted rules to carry out the
statutory directive of Montana Code Annotated § 23-2-302(5) to
consider petitions from persons asking the Commission to limit
recreational use to protect the ecology of the stream, prevent
damage to property, or to limit use of Class II streams to the actual
capacity of the stream.495
The rules set out an administrative process and provide
more detailed criteria for decisions on whether to limit recreational
use. The procedures require a written and signed petition, an
investigation and report by the DFWP, and a timeframe for
Commission decision making, including public notice and
comment.496 The Commission can close or restrict recreational use
when it finds that present public use is damaging the banks and
adjacent land, damaging the property of a riparian landowner,
adversely affecting fish or wildlife, altering natural areas or biotic
communities, or degrading water quality.497 Future use can be
considered if the anticipated use presents a clear and immediate
threat.498
The Commission can prohibit, limit, or restrict
recreational use through orders that are the least disruptive to
recreational use while still providing the necessary protection.499
The Commission may, upon a subsequent petition, alter a previous
order when there are changed circumstances or the alleged damage
did not occur.500
For Class II streams, the Commission can restrict
recreational use to the actual capacity of the stream or prohibit
recreational use when the stream cannot support the use.501 This
author reviewed the files DFWP has kept for each petition. In the
first 18 months after the adoption of the Stream Access Law (July
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.

Mont. Admin. R. 12.4.101-106 (1996).
Id at 12.4.103.
Id. at 12.4.104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.4.105.
Id. at 12.4.106.
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12, 1985 to December 1986), 12 petitions were filed. Of the 12
petitions, two were withdrawn, three were granted or granted in
part and seven were denied.502 Since December 1986, there have
been three petitions, with two denied and one resolved through
settlement.503 The following are examples from those petitions:
A petition to close Nelson Spring Creek, a tributary of the
Yellowstone River near Livingston, based on limited capacity and
impacts to the fishery, was granted in part. The Commission
prohibited wading in specified sections of Nelson Spring Creek to
protect the spawning grounds of cutthroat trout. The prohibition is
in effect during the cutthroat spawning and incubation period, June
15 through September 15 of each year.504 A stream running
through an existing bison pasture was closed to public recreation on
the grounds that the bison posed a safety hazard.505 A petition to
close Ten Mile Creek near Helena was granted in part to close the
stream to swimming and restrict hunting.506 All other petitions
were denied. Generally, the Commission found that the stream,
including its trout populations, biotic communities, and water
quality, and the riparian property was not being damaged by
recreational use.507
502.
Mem. from James W. Flynn, Director, Review of Activities
Related to Steam Access, DFWP. (Dec. 1986) (copy on file with Pub. Land &
Resources L. Rev.).
503.
Review of files maintained by Jim Darling, Fisheries
Division, DFWP.
504.
Re: Petition of William D. Dana, (Mont. St. Fish and Game
Comm’n Jan. 22, 1987) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub.
Land & Resources L. Rev.).
505.
Petition of Bruce M. Cady Requesting Restrictions on the
North Fork of the Musselshell River, (Mont. St. Fish & Game Comm’n June
18, 1986) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub. Land &
Resources L. Rev.).
506.
Re: Petition of F.M. Gannon, (Mont. St. Fish and Game
Comm’n Oct. 11, 1985) (findings of fact and order) (copy on file with Pub.
Land and Resources L. Rev.).
507.
Examples of petitions that were denied: Petition of Donald
R. Siblerud Requesting Restrictions on Mill Creek, (Mont. Fish & Game
Comm’n Jan. 15, 1986) (findings of fact and order); Letter from Stan Meyer,
Chairman, Mont. Fish, Wildlife & Parks Comm’n, to Charles W. and Elena B.
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Even though seldom used now, this petition process has
demonstrated its value. It provides an opportunity for landowners,
who are concerned that public use will damage a stream running
through their property, to have their concerns heard and
considered. In summary, the Commission has concluded that
generally public recreational use of a stream is self-limiting by the
capacity of the stream itself, a judgment that is supported by
practical experience.
XIV.

A REVIEW OF STREAM ACCESS

The University of Montana, Public Policy Research
Institute, conducted a survey in 2005 and published a Montana
Public Policy Report in 2006 (“Report”), entitled “Stream Access
in Montana.”508 The survey and report, twenty years after the
passage of the Stream Access Law in 1985, was intended to identify
unresolved issues and misunderstandings, while also investigating
options for moving forward. The following is this author’s summary
of the Report’s basic conclusions:509




Most recreationists and landowners say the
Stream Access Law works well with few
conflicts with landowners.
Many landowners say the Stream Access
Law adequately protects their property

d’Autremont (Feb. 11, 1999) (denying petition to restrict recreational use of
the Ruby River. The Commission found no evidence that trout populations
were being adversely affected nor evidence of damage to property, biotic
communities, or water quality); FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS COMM’N
MINUTES at 86-88 (Oct. 7, 1996) (Commission voted not to close Sheep Creek
or Muddy Creek flowing through the property of Renee S. Thompson,
Petitioner, to duck hunting and fishing.); Report and Recommendations,
Mont. Fish, Wildlife and Parks (Sept. 5, 1996) (finding no evidence to support
a fishing closure, although the report noted that retrieval of ducks would likely
require a trespass) (copies on file with the Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev.).
508.
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNIV. OF MONT.,
STREAM ACCESS IN MONTANA, MONT. POLICY REPORT 1 (May 2006).
509.
Id. at 7-11.
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rights and they enjoy the benefits of stream
access themselves.
Any problems are relatively minor and can
be addressed by educational efforts,
legislation, and enforcement.
The primary issue is the need to allow fences
to bridge abutments on county roads along
with safe and reasonable access to the stream
or river.

However, a few landowners saw the Stream Access Law as
flawed because, in their opinion, it contradicts legal precedent,
denies landowners the right to control who enters their property,
creates disincentives for landowners to practice good riparian
stewardship, is unenforceable because of vague terms in the law
such as “ordinary high-water mark,” and is impossible to enforce
against trespass, littering, and other illegal activities.510
It is illuminating that the Report’s inventory of specific
conflicts over stream access have been resolved.511 The Mitchell
Slough litigation helped clarify what is a natural stream and what is
a ditch for purposes of public access. The litigation over access at
bridge easements on the Ruby River concluded that recreationists
could access streams at all county bridge crossings including county
roads established by prescriptive use. Also disputes over access at
replacement bridges when the old bridge has been abandoned had
at least been tempered by a policy adopted by the MDT.
The report focused on education to explain the law and
address specific issues such as “trespass, littering, wildfire
prevention, weed control, camping, human waste disposal, and
portaging.”512 In fact, the report opined that the Stream Access
Law was a way of balancing private and public rights, with many
landowners saying they can live with and support the Stream
Access Law because there are provisions in the law that protect

510.
511.
512.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
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their private property interests.513
XV.

COMMENTARY

Both facts and the law matter. In the odyssey of stream
access in Montana, both have played significant, critical, and pivotal
roles. Without their inexorably intertwined combination, it is
difficult to imagine the comprehensive and successful developments
that have molded Montana’s Stream Access Law. First the facts,
then the law.
On the Dearborn River and the Beaverhead River,
landowners had decided to prohibit public floating and fishing,
although the general public had floated and fished on each river for
decades. The landowners had used intimidation, harassment, and
physical barriers in their attempts to stop public use. It is no
surprise that the courts, state district courts and Supreme Court,
would find a way to allow the public to continue to use these rivers.
The surprise was how broad and firmly anchored in Montana
constitutional law and the Public Trust Doctrine the decisions were.
The Curran and Hildreth decisions authored by Chief
Justice Haswell, locked a public right to recreate on state water into
the constitutional ownership of water for the use of its people
secured by the state’s sovereign obligations required by the Public
Trust Doctrine. Therefore, these two decisions set the stage for
legislation and judicial decisions that followed. In theory the
legislation was required to closely follow the Curran and Hildreth
decisions and, if the legislative body did not do so, then the
Supreme Court could or would make it right. However, in a
political world, the legislature in a conservative response could have
attempted to undermine the courts decisions, hoping for a reversal.
Nevertheless, the 1985 Legislature’s response was as unique
and groundbreaking as the Supreme Court decisions. The
compromise and collaboration of the alliance of recreationist
groups and the alliance of landowner groups resulted in legislation
that was faithful to the holdings of the Supreme Court. The

513.

Id. at 22.
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recreationists gained clear and detailed protection of stream access
rights while the landowner alliance gained protection of private
property rights by prohibiting trespass outside of the bed and
banks, e.g. no public right to cross private land or to establish
prescriptive use easements, by prohibitions on the use of private
ditches, and by limits on potential landowner liability for users of
streams and rivers. In many, if not all subsequent legislative
sessions, the present Stream Access Law probably would not have
passed resulting in a prolonged controversy.
As expected, opponents of the Stream Access Law would
test the law both directly and by attempting to chip away at its
margins. The numerous attempts to challenge the Stream Access
Law constitutionally as a taking without just compensation have
failed with the courts finding that in setting the line between the
rights of private landowners over whose land a publicly owned
stream flows and the public’s right to use the stream, nothing was
taken from the private landowners.
One of the issues that this author sees as potentially still not
entirely resolved is the status of the strip between the high-water to
low-water marks on navigable for title rivers. The Galt I decision
limited or qualified the public’s right to use the strip, as allowed in
the original Stream Access Law language, without addressing
whether Montana, in 1895 could have constitutionally and
consistent with the Public Trust Doctrine, ceded ownership to
riparian landowners. Or, when the fee title in the strip was ceded,
what retained public use rights and state control in the form of an
easement are required pursuant to the Constitution and the Public
Trust Doctrine.
The controversy over the status of Mitchell Slough is a
prime example of an attempt to chip away at the margins of the
Stream Access Law by turning live river channels and streams into
private fishing “ditches.” The Supreme Court in its 7-0 decision
held Mitchell Slough was a natural water body subject to the right
of the public to recreate under the Stream Access Law. Legislative
attempts to reverse the Mitchell Slough decision would have led to
similar claims under similar circumstances to turn river channels,
and even streams, into private “fishing ditches.”
Denying access to streams and rivers at county bridges was
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another attempt to limit the public’s ability to use streams and
rivers. The Achilles heel of legislative bills to limit access as not
qualifying as a public road purpose was the potential collateral
damage to the ability of counties to expand the use of a county road
as needed to support expanding public needs such at telephone
lines, power lines, sewer lines, etc., without new easements that
would be difficult or impossible to acquire or without expensive and
lengthy condemnation.
The recent and prescient PLAA v. Madison County
decision by the Supreme Court that county roads must have a
broad range of potential uses under the umbrella of public road
purposes benefits counties, road users, and recreationists. The
court applied this principle to roads created by dedication, petition,
and public prescriptive use to hold that access to streams and rivers
at county bridge crossings was a public road purpose. The court
held, however, that the width of a public prescriptive use road was
to be determined based on the facts of historic use. The case-bycase determination will put counties in a practical difficulty.
Many county roads look like and are administered just like
petitioned or dedicated county roads -- they were just established
by a sort of road wedlock. In hindsight, a more practical, and
probably just as legally justified, solution would be, or could
eventually be, that the width of a county prescriptive road is 60 feet,
the same default width as all other county roads, except subject to
an acknowledge rebuttable presumption. This would remove a
cloud over the remaining uncertainty for county prescriptive roads
and shift the focus to just the county roads where the width of the
road may be a legitimate issue.
The management of public recreational use of rivers and
streams by DFWP and the Commission has been successful,
especially viewed from the vantage point of case-by-case, or streamby-stream, efforts. DFWP has worked with landowners and
recreationists to build fences at bridge crossings that meet the twin
objectives of controlling livestock while facilitating safe and
practical access to the underlying stream. The Commission has
functioned as a relief-valve by ruling on petitions to restrict stream
access because of claimed resource harm or property damage,
although in most circumstances the capacity of a stream has
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functioned as a self-executing limitation. Allocating recreational
use, preserving the benefits of recreating in streams and rivers, and
reducing conflicts has been and can be addressed in Commission
rulemaking. Portage routes have been handled in a low-key
manner, generally by the face-to-face collaboration between
landowners and DFWP field personnel.
A word of caution is appropriate. Comprehensive public
access has benefitted from favorable factual situations and
corresponding favorable legislative and judicial responses.
Supporters of stream access would be wise to appreciate that the
reverse can happen. Abuses of recreational access, such as littering,
trespass, out-of-control dogs, or failures to respect the rights of
private property owners, could lead to restrictions on stream access.
One particular, potential example comes to mind. If hunters use
stream corridors as public access through private property to get to
public land, this is not a stream access right. If this abuse reaches a
trigger level, the eventual legislative and judicial response will most
likely not be to the liking of stream access proponents.
In summary, Montana Stream Access Law, while very
broad, is also not complicated, has avoided lingering and divisive
controversies, benefits from clear and straightforward statutory
direction and limitations, and helps protect private property
interests. These reasons help explain its remarkable success over
the past three decades. Montana is fortunate compared to many
neighboring states, from the perspective of supporters of stream
access. In Montana, if a person can legally access a stream, he or
she can fish, whether floating or wading, as long as he or she stays
within the ordinary high-water lines. Public access is available from
state and federal public lands, including fishing access sites
provided by fee purchases or easements obtained by DFWP or
federal agencies, at highway and county road bridge crossings or by
permission of private landowners.
Recreationists owe a debt of gratitude to the 1984 Montana
Supreme Court for its landmark decisions, authored by Chief
Justice Haswell, that guarantee public stream access to all rivers
and streams. They also owe a debt of gratitude to the 1985
Legislature’s passage of the Stream Access Law that was the
product of not only the members of the legislature but also the
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unparalleled, collaborative support of strong and inclusive alliances
of both landowners and recreationists, with the additional support
of DFWP. The result is an amazingly simple and straightforward
law that codifies a public right to recreate in streams and rivers, but
also carefully defines the limits of public access. For landowners,
the debt is to the collective wisdom of their alliance in honoring the
Supreme Court decision while negotiating respect for and
preserving the rights of riparian, private landowners within the
language of the law.
The result is a Stream Access Law that works, has gained
increasing respect, and has proven its value. For thirty years the
law has weathered constitutional challenges and attempts to
undermine it by denying access from public road crossings and by
defining live streams as ditches. These challenges have actually
made the Stream Access Law stronger by ensuring that streams
cannot become fishing ditches and by guaranteeing and enhancing
access at public bridge crossings. Citizen vigilance, support, and
advocacy have been the crucial factors in preserving and
strengthening the Stream Access Law.

